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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The focus of our research 
 
This research has been carried out in order to contribute to public debate about the adequacy of the 
official response relating to allegations of serious abuses perpetrated by the UK military during the 
Iraq war and occupation, also taking into account the ongoing International Criminal Court (ICC) 
preliminary examination concerning these allegations.  
 
The research has focused on reviewing and assessing the steps taken domestically to promote (or 
obstruct) accountability and developing recommendations regarding any accountability deficits 
concerning alleged abuses perpetrated by the UK military in Iraq. In our research we have considered 
the decision-making processes and rationales given for keeping open or closing domestic criminal 
investigations and not pursuing prosecutions, as well as decisions to transfer matters to inquiry 
processes in lieu of criminal processes; procedural and regulatory aspects relating to the few military 
investigations and related procedures which remain open and their progress; rulings of civil courts 
with oversight over certain matters relevant to the investigations; any lacunae in UK legislation as 
well as issues relating to the UK Government’s cooperation with the preliminary examination of the 
ICC Prosecutor and analysis of the ICC Prosecutor’s policy statements and practice regarding the 
concepts of complementarity, where relevant to the Iraq preliminary examination.  
 
Methodology 
 
Our main methodology has been to seek out, compile and analyse publicly available information 
through official sources, and to supplement this with a select number of informal and formal 
interviews. Thus, we have reviewed information on official websites, analysed parliamentary reports, 
court judgments and filings, media statements, academic studies, advocacy and policy reports. In 
addition, we have sought to fill certain gaps in information with Freedom of Information Act requests. 
We took all possible steps to consider the issues from an array of perspectives and angles and to 
obtain the widest possible array of viewpoints.  
 
Partly as a result of the difficulties we encountered in accessing certain information that in our 
estimation should have been in the public domain, we have decided to feature the right to information 
as one of the substantive focuses of our discussion paper (See Section III.I(a)).  
 
As part of our research, we submitted evidence to the UK Defence Committee’s Statute of limitations 
– veterans’ protection inquiry.1 The scope of that inquiry is explained as a ‘Committee investigation 
into the question of how former service personnel can be protected from the spectre of investigation 
and re-investigation for events that happened many years, and often decades, earlier.’2  
 
The background to our research – the need to engage with and challenge public narratives 
 
The research was carried out under the spectre of two separate but sometimes intertwined public 
narratives relating to the Iraq claims and the legal processes set up to address them, which have 
developed and become ingrained over time.  
 
                                                 
1 Our Written Evidence is available on the website of the Committee: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/defence-committee/statute-of-limitations-veterans-
protection/written/87024.pdf  
2 As set out on the Inquiry front page: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/inquiry13/  
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One – the perspective that despite the significant physical and other evidence of serious abuses and 
wrongful deaths including civil judgments finding the Ministry of Defence (MoD) liable for harm 
caused to Iraqis as well as several out of court settlements, a large proportion of criminal 
investigations have been shut down and as a result there has been a lack of criminal accountability 
for acts of extreme seriousness which would under normal circumstances result in conviction and 
punishment.  
 
Two – the perspective that soldiers have been subjected to an inordinate degree of scrutiny – the 
‘spectre of investigation and reinvestigation for events that happened many years, and often decades, 
earlier’3 which has been unfair to them and has negatively impacted morale.  
 
These two perspectives operate alongside each other – they are not necessarily contradictory, despite 
the strict and oversimplified logic of polarity that has often been applied to them.  
 
Ideally, criminal investigations and prosecutions should bring about closure – closure to the victims 
of abuses and their families, who have a right to understand what happened and why, and the right to 
expect that criminal behaviour will result in appropriate sanctions; closure to the suspects, who should 
receive fair treatment in any investigations and prosecutions and be either found guilty where the 
evidence so supports or cleared of wrongdoing where the evidence is wanting. In addition, criminal 
investigations and prosecutions are vital tools to maintain proper oversight and control over persons 
who, because of their positions, functions and access to weapons, exert significant power over the 
local population. Criminal procedure is an important check on the potential for abuse of power. It 
helps reinforce the rule of law, reminds individuals of the limits of acceptable behaviour and makes 
clear that there will be consequences when those limits are overstepped. The purposes of criminal 
investigations were described by Lord Bingham in R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department: ‘to ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light; that culpable and 
discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice; that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing 
(if unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified; and that those who 
have lost their loved ones may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from his 
death may save the lives of others.’4  
 
However, this justification for criminal investigations and prosecutions becomes murky, if 
investigations are delayed, weak, inefficient or ineffective, or – as will sometimes happen – where 
the investigations are pro forma, instituted half-heartedly in order to comply with a perceived rule or 
directive as opposed to with the clear intention to arrive at the truth. In such situations, both the 
victims of abuse, and the individuals accused of the abuse, lose out – neither get real closure. The 
victims will not see the perpetrators prosecuted and the accused person is never fully cleared of 
suspicion. The individuals – whether they are private persons or officials of the State - may evade 
prosecution, but, and as we have seen with our research, the prospect of investigation and re-
investigation is ever-present.  
 
This murkiness has been considered by judges and others, and is mainly perceived through the lens 
of two legal principles:  
 
The first is the principle of double jeopardy, also known as ne bis in idem – the notion that an 
individual who is accused of a crime should not be tried more than once on the same (or similar) 
                                                 
3 UK Parliament Defence Committee, ‘Statute of limitations – veterans protection inquiry’, ‘scope of the inquiry’, 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/inquiry13/.  
4 R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 1 AC 653, para. 31. 
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charges and on the same facts. This principle is in place to promote finality and is understood to be 
part of the requirements of a fair trial. In English law as in some other jurisdictions, the principle is 
subject to exceptions.5 For instance, with certain serious offences, a new trial can take place even 
after an acquittal when new, compelling, reliable and substantial evidence comes to light.6 Human 
rights bodies have recognised more broadly that double jeopardy will also not apply to dismissals or 
acquittals where the decisions were taken to shield a person from criminal responsibility. As the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has held: 
 
With regard to the ne bis in idem principle, although it is acknowledged as a human right ... it is not an absolute 
right, and therefore, is not applicable where: i) the intervention of the court that heard the case and decided to 
dismiss it or to acquit a person responsible for violating human rights or international law, was intended to shield 
the accused party from criminal responsibility; ii) the proceedings were not conducted independently or 
impartially in accordance with due procedural guarantees, or iii) there was no real intent to bring those 
responsible to justice. A judgment rendered in the foregoing circumstances produces an “apparent” or 
“fraudulent” res judicata case. On the other hand, the Court believes that if there appear new facts or evidence 
that make it possible to ascertain the identity of those responsible for human rights violations or for crimes 
against humanity, investigations can be reopened, even if the case ended in an acquittal with the authority of a 
final judgment, since the dictates of justice, the rights of the victims, and the spirit and the wording of the 
American Convention supersedes the protection of the ne bis in idem principle.7 
 
The inapplicability of the rule on double jeopardy to shield a person from multiple proceedings when 
the initial proceeding was carried out in such a way to shield a person from criminal responsibility 
also follows from Article 20 of the ICC Statute and is also incorporated into the UK’s ICC Statute.8  
 
Whether a new trial will take place will depend on the overall circumstances, and a range of factors 
will be taken into account in arriving at such a decision. That is the law with respect to completed 
prosecutions; the related question as to whether investigations which are closed without any decision 
taken to prosecute can be re-opened, has also been answered in the affirmative. The double jeopardy 
rule does not normally extend to investigations which have not resulted in a final acquittal or 
conviction.9 It only applies to proceedings which achieve finality – investigations which are aborted 
do not tend to fall within that category. Furthermore, even if there is a final proceeding resulting in 
an acquittal, as indicated, proceedings can exceptionally be re-opened.  
 
The second is the principle of the effectiveness of investigations. Human rights law requires that 
investigations are effective, meaning that they are sufficiently robust and independent so as to be 
capable of leading to a prosecution. This is an obligation of means and not of result. As set out by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), ‘[n]ot every investigation should necessarily be 
successful or come to a conclusion which coincides with the claimant’s account of events; however, 
it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the 
allegations prove to be true, to the identification and punishment of those responsible.’10 An 
investigation which falls short of those requirements will not comply with a State’s procedural 
                                                 
5 The introduction of exceptions in English law is summarised in, Sally Broadbridge, ‘Double Jeopardy’, House of Commons Library, Home Affairs 
Section, Research Briefing SN/HA/1082, 27 January 2009, available at: 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN01082/SN01082.pdf.   
6 Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Art 4 of Protocol No. 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights similarly provides for an exception 
to the rule on double jeopardy: ‘2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance with the law 
and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the 
previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case.’ See also, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 on Article 14: 
Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, para. 56. 
7 Almonacid-Arellano et al v Chile, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No. 154, 26 September 2006, para.154  
8 ICC Statute, Art. 20(3). 
9 See, e.g., a series of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: Marguš v Croatia (Grand Chamber), Appl. no. 4455/10, 27 May 2014, 
para. 120; Sundqvist v Finland, Appl. no. 75602/01, 22 November 2005; Smirnova v Russia, Appl. no. 46133/99 48183/99, 3 October 2002; 
Harutyunyan v Armenia, Appl. no. 34334/04, 7 December 2006.  
10 Mikheyev v Russia, ECtHR, Appl. no. 77617/01, 26 January 2006, para. 107. 
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obligations under human rights law, particularly for right to life and torture and ill-treatment cases.11 
The remedy for this failing in certain circumstances may be to require a new investigation, and/or in 
some cases, to re-institute criminal proceedings.12  
 
Thus, when considering the public narratives about the lack of criminal prosecutions amounting to 
impunity, or the spectre of ‘investigation and re-investigation’ resulting in a denial of the rights of 
suspects, it is important to consider the requirements and limits of the underlying legal framework of 
double jeopardy on the one hand, and the obligation for investigations to be effective, on the other. 
We have found this to be a helpful way in which to consider and analyse the facts and possible 
solutions for gaps or structural weaknesses where these have become apparent through the research.  
 
A summary of our preliminary findings 
 
The preliminary findings are set out at the end of this discussion paper.  
 
In summary, our discussion paper raises a number of concerns about the adequacy of criminal 
investigations into alleged soldier abuses. Investigations in Iraq have been negatively impacted by 
the initial governmental position that investigations into conduct in Iraq did not need to comply with 
the procedural obligations under Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (prohibition of torture and ill-
treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or European Convention),13 
coupled with ‘a more or less obvious closing of ranks,’14 and the failure of the chain of command to 
address that closure. As noted in the court martial proceedings relating to the death of Baha Mousa:  
 
…the beatings and ill-treatment of the detainees continued and intensified. And yet none of those soldiers has 
been charged with any offence simply because there is no evidence against them as a result of a more or less 
obvious closing of ranks.15 
 
Commenting on this, Sir William Gage, who chaired the Baha Mousa inquiry, noted:  
 
I hoped that it would be possible to breach the ‘more or less obvious closing of ranks’ referred to by the Judge 
Advocate (Mr Justice McKinnon) at the court martial. This closing of ranks has often been referred to in the 
press as the ‘wall of silence’. To some extent this was successful and the evidence of some soldiers went a great 
deal further than hitherto. However, I have concluded that a number, not all, continued to hide behind oft-
repeated phrases such as ‘I can’t remember’ or ‘I did not see anything untoward’. This was, to say the least, 
regrettable and cannot be excused or justified.16 
 
These failings impeded certain evidence from coming to light and the passage of time appears to have 
entrenched those initial evidentiary gaps. Our understanding is that later the Iraq Historic Allegations 
Team (IHAT) investigations, despite good intentions, were further hampered in their efforts to arrive 
at the truth by the passage of time since the initial allegations, as well as the perception that the 
investigations were simply being kept open to give a good showing to the ICC that genuine 
investigations were underway (and consequently that there was no jurisdiction for the ICC to proceed 
to a full investigation). Furthermore, our research indicates that there has been real or perceived 
interference in the decisions to close investigations, though the extent to which this occurred is a 
subject requiring further investigation.  
 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 See, e.g., Brecknell v United Kingdom, ECtHR, Appl. no. 32457/04, 27 November 2008. 
13 Al-Skeini and Others v The United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), ECtHR, Appl. no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011. 
14 Court martial proceedings concerning the death of Baha Mousa, McKinnon J, Transcript, 13 February 2007, CM 79/22/19-23.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Sir William Gage, ‘The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry’, Vol I, HC 1452–I, 8 September 2011, para. 2.4. 
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Soldiers have been negatively impacted by the continuing uncertainty caused by the lack of finality 
of investigations. However, this has as much to do with the inadequacy of initial investigations (as 
determined by the courts) as it has been by the perseverance of victims of the alleged abuse and their 
counsel, whose efforts to seek out the truth have largely failed. The Government’s position should 
have been neutral and detached in order to preserve and foster the independence of the process of 
investigations and prosecutions. Instead, Government officials have focused at least in part on 
avoiding the opening of an ICC investigation and, at least some of them, on blaming lawyers – and 
by extension the victims of alleged abuses – for pursuing legal claims. As we argue, the Government 
should focus on increasing the capacity for efficient, transparent and effective investigations that 
comply with its procedural obligations under the European Convention and which are capable of 
weeding out quickly any spurious or clearly unfounded claims, and strengthening the capacity for 
robust, timely and transparent investigations where credible allegations are raised. Naturally there 
will be a mixture of quality in allegations made as there is with all criminal complaints. Strengthening 
investigative capacity and independence, and facilitating focus on broader systemic issues would be 
the best way to give effect to the rights of victims, protect soldiers from legal uncertainty and ensure 
full compliance with the UK’s legal obligations.  
 
In general, our view is that the ICC preliminary examination and the prospect for it to develop into a 
full investigation has played a useful, albeit limited, role in maintaining pressure on UK authorities 
to keep open investigations for which there has been otherwise little political appetite. However, this 
has not significantly impacted the quality or scope of legal processes in the UK, nor has it been an 
impetus for domestic prosecutions – and with the passage of time the prospect for prosecutions 
continues to diminish.17   
 
Wider significance of findings 
 
One aspect of our research has been focused on assessing the extent to which lessons have been 
learned and policies adopted and implemented to safeguard against the prospect of future abuses. 
This part of our inquiry was judged as particularly important, given the resurfacing of the banned ‘5 
techniques’ from Northern Ireland onto the battlefield in Iraq.18  
 
In the context of addressing Iraq allegations, a Systemic Issues Working Group (SIWG) was set up 
by the MoD specifically to address such ‘wider’ issues. However, information on the follow-up of 
the findings of this group remains opaque. As the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, 
justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence recently concluded with respect to efforts to 
address the legacy of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, and which we see as a conclusion also 
applicable to the legacy of abuses in Iraq: ‘It is critical, however, to direct attention to instruments 
that may capture the more “structural” dimension of violations and abuses, so that victims and society 
receive answers on whether the violations were part of a pattern reflecting a policy under the 
responsibility of institutions with identifiable chains of command. This issue is critical to establishing 
the trustworthiness of institutions.’19 The UN Special Rapporteur further noted: ‘[t]he structural and 
systemic dimensions of violence and rights violations and abuses should be examined. A 
                                                 
17 See generally, Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘Accountability for British War Crimes in Iraq? Examining the Nexus Between International and National 
Justice Responses’, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (ed), Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Reviewing Impact, Policies and 
Practices, Vol 1 (Brussels: Torkal Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2018) 399; Human Rights Watch, ‘Pressure Point: The ICC’s Impact on National 
Justice: Lessons from Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, and the United Kingdom’, May 2018, pp. 116-152.  
18 The Rt Hon Sir William Gage, ‘The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry’, Vol II, HC 1452–II, 8 September 2011, who refers throughout to a 
‘gradual loss of the doctrine’ prohibiting the use of the ‘five techniques’ – involving hooding, white noise, food and drink deprivation, painful stress 
positions and sleep deprivation. 
19 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence on his 
mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ UN Doc. A/HRC/34/62/Add.1, 17 November 2016, para. 111. 
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comprehensive understanding of the past requires instruments that do not treat it merely as a series 
of unconnected events.’20   
 
Beyond the need to take all steps to forestall the prospect of recurrence of serious abuses, in our view, 
it would have been appropriate for the SIWG to have considered the adequacy of investigations and 
prosecutions, particularly after the finding of the ECtHR regarding the extraterritorial application of 
the UK’s human rights obligations to conflict contexts, at least in respect of individuals who are 
within their authority or effective control.21 This does not appear to have been a focus of the group 
or any other Government agency or body,22 nor does it appear to have been the focus of Parliament. 
Instead, the SIWG has focused mainly on identifying training needs and areas for changes in 
operational policies and the Central Government and the Parliament’s Defence Committee has largely 
focused on limiting the prospect for future civil suits and criminal investigations, including by 
exploring the possibility for derogations to the European Convention in future instances in which 
military are deployed overseas as well as adopting a statute of limitations covering conflict-related 
crimes of the past.    
 
 
  
                                                 
20 Ibid, para. 125. 
21 Al-Skeini and Others v The United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), ECtHR, Appl. no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011. 
22 Indeed, as recently as November 2017, the UK Government asserted that ‘The UKG continues to take the view that the international human rights 
obligations under the UN treaties ratified by the UK, including CAT, are primarily territorial and do not have extraterritorial effect.’ See, UN 
Committee Against Torture, ‘Sixth periodic report submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 19 of the 
Convention pursuant to the optional reporting procedure, due in 2017’, UN Doc CAT/C/GBR/6, 29 January 2018, para. 9. 
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II. THE CONTEXT  
 
II.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Numerous sources suggest that British forces taking part in the Iraq war and occupation were 
responsible for serious abuse of Iraqi detainees, unlawful deaths and other crimes. Less than two 
months after the US and UK invaded Iraq, Amnesty International began investigating claims that 
Iraqi prisoners of war were tortured by British and US troops. The organisation found that a 
‘substantial portion’ of the detainees interviewed had been mistreated.23 Later that year, an inquiry 
into the death of Baha Mousa, an Iraqi civilian in British custody, found that his death was caused by 
factors which included stress positions and lack of food and water.24 In January 2004, Britain’s Armed 
Forces Minister Adam Ingram rejected calls for an independent inquiry, asserting that the complaints 
procedures in place were adequate. However, just a few months later, in May 2004, allegations of 
human rights abuses were again made against British troops in the aftermath of the Battle of Danny 
Boy in Basra.25 These allegations were examined in the five-year Al-Sweady Inquiry, which 
concluded in 2014 and ultimately determined that the vast majority of the allegations were untrue. In 
his conclusions, Sir Thayne Forbes writes that ‘the vast majority of the allegations made against the 
British military, which this Inquiry was required to investigate (including, without exception, all the 
most serious allegations), were wholly and entirely without merit or justification.....’; he also notes 
however that ‘certain aspects of the way in which the nine Iraqi detainees, with whom this Inquiry is 
primarily concerned, were treated by the British military, during the time they were in British custody 
during 2004, amounted to actual or possible ill-treatment.’26 A report by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) expressed concerns about the treatment of detainees. The report which 
details serious violations of international humanitarian law in UK-controlled areas was later leaked.27 
NGOs and charities operating in southern Iraq, the area controlled by British troops following the 
2003 invasion, continued to investigate and document allegations of mistreatment of detainees, 
including torture and deaths of inmates. The allegations were then passed on to Public Interest 
Lawyers (PIL), who eventually took on the cases. This led to strong responses by the political 
leadership in the UK, including calls for suspending the Human Rights Act 1998.28 
 
On 10 January 2014, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and PIL 
submitted a 250-page communication to the ICC Prosecutor detailing alleged abuses perpetrated by 
British troops in Iraq from 2003-2008 and asking the Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary examination 
and to ‘submit a request for authorization of an investigation to the Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 
15(3) of the ICC Statute, in order to initiate a full investigation with all duties and powers provided 
by Article 54 of the ICC Statute.’29 
 
The ICC Prosecutor is currently conducting a preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq. In 
November 2017 the Prosecutor concluded that there is a reasonable basis to believe crimes within the 
Court’s jurisdiction were committed and the Office is therefore now focusing on whether potential 
cases would be admissible under the ICC’s complementarity regime.30 A range of investigative 
                                                 
23 Amnesty International, Iraq: One Year on the Human Rights Situation Remains Dire (2004), AI Index: MDE 14/006/2004, 10-11. See also, BBC 
News: ‘Timeline: Alleged abuses in Iraq’, 10 May 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3701887.stm.  
24 The Rt Hon Sir William Gage, The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, Volume 1, HC 1452–I (2011), para. 2.1043.  
25 Jonathan Owen, ‘Exclusive: Devastating dossier on “abuse” by UK forces in Iraq goes to International Criminal Court’, The Independent, 11 
January 2014. 
26 Sir Thayne Forbes, ‘The Report of the Al Sweady Inquiry’, HC 818-I, 17 December 2014, paras. 5.196-5.199. 
27 House of Commons, Hansard, ‘Iraq: Security/Mistreatment Allegations’ Vol 421, 10 May 2004; the leaked report: https://cryptome.org/icrc-
report.htm.  
28 See e.g. Tim Ross, ‘Defence Secretary Michael Fallon: Suspend the Human Rights Act to Protect Our Troops’, The Telegraph, 26 December 2015. 
29 ECCHR and PIL, Dossier, ‘The Responsibility of Officials of the United Kingdom for War Crimes Involving Systematic Detainee Abuse in Iraq 
from 2003-2008’, 10 January 2014. 
30 Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), ‘Report on preliminary examination activities 2017’, 4 December 2017, paras. 193-197 
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processes have been put in place in the UK, the most renowned being the IHAT, which until recently 
was tasked with criminal investigations of the Iraq claims. However, due to pressures and claims of 
inefficiency, IHAT was terminated in 2017, leaving a smaller team of service police investigators – 
the Service Police Legacy Investigation (SPLI) – to complete the investigation of remaining cases. 
Despite thousands of claims, criminal accountability has been very minimal. In the notorious incident 
of the death of Baha Mousa, only one British soldier was convicted after having pled guilty to the 
crime of inhuman treatment; he was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment. Other processes are 
in place, including civil claims and inquisitorial inquiries for certain fatality cases. Taken together, 
however, as noted by Human Rights Watch, these legal processes come across as ‘piecemeal, ad-hoc, 
and almost exclusively driven by the efforts of individual victims, their families, and legal 
representatives.’31 
 
II.2 LEGAL PROCESSES IN THE UK 
 
A variety of legal processes have been established to address alleged abuses committed during the 
Iraq war and occupation, but they do so in quite different ways: 
  
 Criminal investigations, initially Royal Military Police (RMP) investigations which led to a 
limited number of courts martial, and more recently the investigations undertaken by the IHAT 
and later the SPLI, in conjunction with the Service Prosecution Authority (SPA).  
 A coroner type process, known as the Iraq Fatality Investigations (IFI).  
 Civil suits, public inquiries and judicial reviews aimed at satisfying obligations under the 
ECHR (and the implementing legislation in the UK, the Human Rights Act 1998) to 
investigate violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention. Additionally, the 
military has undertaken its own investigations, leading to the publication of the Aitken Report 
(2008) and the Purdy Report (2010).32  
 
a) Criminal investigations and trials in the UK 
 
Courts martial 
From the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 to January 2008, 229 allegations of criminal activity were 
investigated by the RMP. Of these, 20 were taken forward, some of them simply summarily dealt 
within the chain of command and some by court martial. Four courts martial led to the conviction of 
altogether seven soldiers, with sentences ranging from a severe reprimand to dismissal with disgrace 
and imprisonment.33 One case was referred to the Crown Prosecution Service, leading to a not guilty 
verdict, and a further 12 allegations were investigated but did not result in prosecution.34 
 
In the first court martial in Osnabrück, Germany, in January 2005, three soldiers were accused of 
abuse of Iraqi civilians at Camp Breadbasket near Basra on 15 May 2003.35 The defence lawyers 
submitted that the soldiers had been following superior orders and they had been ordered to bring the 
                                                 
31 Human Rights Watch, ‘Pressure Point: The ICC’s Impact on National Justice: Lessons from Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, and the United Kingdom’, 
May 2018, p. 120. 
32 Brigadier Aitken, ‘The Aitken report: an investigation into cases of deliberate abuse and unlawful killing in Iraq in 2003 and 2004’, 25 January 
2008; Brigadier Purdy OBE, ‘Army Inspectorate Review into the implementation of Policy, Training and Conduct of Detainee Handling’, 15 July 
2010.  
33 Rachel Kerr, The Military on Trial: The British Army in Iraq (Wolf Legal Publishers: Nijmegen, 2009). 
34 MoD SIWG, ‘Systemic Issues Identified from Service Police and Other Investigations into Military Operations Overseas: August 2018,’ para. 
7.1.6. 
35 R v Kenyon, Larkin and Cooley (Osnabruck, Germany), cited in Rachel Kerr, ‘The UK in Iraq and the ICC: Judicial Intervention, Positive 
Complementarity and the Politics of International Criminal Justice’, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds), Quality Control in Preliminary 
Examination: Volume 1, (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher: Brussels, 2018) 451, pp. 487-488: Appendix 2. 
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suspects into the camp with the intention of ‘working them hard.’36 The defendants felt the chain of 
command had broken down and that this resulted in them becoming scapegoats, whereas the Army 
Prosecution Authority admitted that the order that was given was illegal under the Geneva 
Conventions but claimed that that the soldiers went beyond the orders given with their behaviour.37 
The soldiers were given sentences from 140 days to two years.38 
 
In the case of the killing by shooting of Hassan Abbas Said (later: IHAT 177 and investigation by 
IFI), the commanding officer determined that this was not an unlawful killing, deciding against court 
martial. The Army Prosecuting Authority, however, passed the case to the Attorney-General who 
then referred it to the Crown Prosecution Service. In April 2005, the Central Criminal Court found 
the soldier not guilty of murder and discharged the case after the Crown Prosecution Service offered 
no evidence. At a later point, during an IFI investigation to establish the facts of the situation that led 
to the death of Hassan Said, Sir George Newman noted that ‘the soldier who fired the shot refused to 
co-operate’ but that ‘it was not in the interests of the Investigation to take steps to compel him to 
provide evidence.’39 
 
In another case, Nadheem Abdullah died from blows to his head, inflicted by one or more soldiers on 
11 May 2003.40 In November 2005, a court martial dismissed the charges against seven soldiers who 
had been charged with murder, despite the finding that there might be sufficient evidence to show 
that Abdullah had died as a result of an assault carried out by the seven defendants.41 The evidence 
was too weak or vague to secure a conviction and the prosecution was unable to identify any single 
defendant who applied unlawful force, leading to a verdict of ‘no case to answer’. Nonetheless, the 
court martial noted that the RMP investigation was inadequate and suffered from serious omissions.42 
In a subsequent IFI investigation into the death of Mr Abdullah, both factual and procedural issues 
were raised. Sir George Newman indicated that he found no evidence, and it was not suggested to 
him at any stage, that the degree of force which was used to cause the fatal injury was necessary to 
secure Mr Abdullah’s compliance with the demands of the soldiers. Sir George Newman found that 
the treatment was more violent than was required in the circumstances.43 He made exhaustive 
inquiries to find the transcript of the court martial but concluded that it had probably, in all its previous 
forms, including as a disk, been destroyed or thrown away. There were certain hard copy extracts, 
including the Judge Advocate’s ruling at the closing of the prosecution’s case, which demonstrated 
that there had been major issues of credibility, particularly in connection with some of the Iraqi 
witnesses. Importantly, it transpired that the soldiers had not given oral evidence and thus had not 
been examined and cross-examined during the court martial.44  
 
The drowning of Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali in the British custody in May 2003 (later: IHAT 85 and 
investigation by IFI) led to the indictment of four soldiers for manslaughter. A court martial found 
that the use of ‘wetting’, in the form of submerging looters in canals and rivers to encourage them to 
                                                 
36 Audrey Gillan, ‘Seniors’ behaviour infected’ soldiers’, The Guardian, 11 February 2005. 
37 REDRESS, ‘UK Army in Iraq: Time to Come Clean on Civilian Torture’, October 2007, pp. 9-11. 
38 Audrey Gillan, ‘Army cleared major who gave illegal order’, The Guardian, 22 January 2005. 
39 IFI, ‘Consolidated Report into the Death of Nadheem Abdullah and the Death of Hassan Abbas Said’, Cm 9023, March 2015, para. 3.15. 
40 Ibid.  
41 R v Evans and others (Colchester, UK), cited in Rachel Kerr, ‘The UK in Iraq and the ICC: Judicial Intervention, Positive Complementarity and the 
Politics of International Criminal Justice’ in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds), Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 1, 
(Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher: Brussels, 2018) 451, pp. 487-488: Appendix 2. 
42 See ECCHR and PIL, Dossier, ‘The Responsibility of Officials of the United Kingdom for War Crimes Involving Systematic Detainee Abuse in 
Iraq from 2003-2008’, 10 January 2014, pp. 222-223. 
43 IFI, ‘Consolidated Report into the Death of Nadheem Abdullah and the Death of Hassan Abbas Said’, Cm 9023, March 2015, para. 11.12. 
44 Ibid, para. 3.4. 
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go home, constituted minimum use of force in the circumstances.45 Four soldiers were found not 
guilty of murder by court martial in May and June 2006.46 In a subsequent investigation, Sir George 
Newman noted: ‘it is not presently clear to what extent details of the state of affairs up to the 8th of 
May 2003 were communicated to London. This in turn raises questions about the extent of the 
knowledge of the chain of military command in Iraq as to what was happening on the ground.’47 
 
Most controversial was the case concerning Baha Mousa (later: IHAT 153).48 On 15 September 2003, 
Baha Da’oud Salim Mousa, an Iraqi civilian, died whilst in British custody at a military base in 
Southern Iraq. In the days and hours leading up to his death, Mousa was subjected to numerous 
assaults, resulting in 93 separate injuries.  Seven soldiers were charged (R v Payne) with manslaughter 
and inhuman treatment, including commanding officer, Colonel Jorge Mendonca. Only one was 
convicted, corporal Donald Payne, who pled guilty to inhumane treatment as a war crime and was 
sentenced to 12-months imprisonment.49 To date, this is the only conviction of a British soldier under 
the ICC Act.50 To the extent public information is available, the case is still under consideration by 
either the SPLI or the Director of Service Prosecutions (DSP).51 
 
Accordingly, altogether four courts martial relating to the situation in Iraq have been completed, 
leading to the conviction of seven soldiers, out of which only one concerned a war crime. Most 
defendants have been acquitted or the cases discontinued by the Advocate General.  
 
IHAT and SPLI 
IHAT was established by the MoD in March 2010 to investigate allegations of criminal conduct by 
British military personnel during operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2009, as a way to comply with 
Britain’s obligations to undertake independent investigations under human rights law.52 This 
followed an application for judicial review filed in February 2010 in the case Ali Zaki Mousa v 
Secretary of State for Defence (No. 1), which challenged the ongoing RMP investigations in light of 
the Government’s obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR, and demanded a single public 
inquiry into all instances of killing and mistreatment in Iraq.53 The High Court rejected the application 
brought by PIL, opting instead to endorse the Government’s ‘wait and see’ approach – with the 
possibility of reassessing the need to establish an inquiry after the conclusion of the IHAT’s work 
and the work of the other public inquiries.54 The Court ordered certain changes to IHAT procedures 
in order to increase independence, because of the inclusion of RMP personnel in the investigation of 
matters where the RMP had been involved in Iraq, and in March 2012, the MoD announced that RMP 
personnel were to be removed from IHAT and replaced by members of the Royal Navy Police. 
                                                 
45 R v Selman, McCleary and McGing (Colchester, UK), cited in Rachel Kerr, ‘The UK in Iraq and the ICC: Judicial Intervention, Positive 
Complementarity and the Politics of International Criminal Justice’ in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds), Quality Control in Preliminary 
Examination: Volume 1, (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher: Brussels, 2018) 451, pp. 487-488: Appendix 2. 
46 See Paolina Massidda, ‘Criminal Responsibility of International Military Missions and Personnel’ in Marco Odello and Ryszard Piotrowicz (eds), 
International Military Missions and International Law, (Brill, The Netherlands, 2011) 211, pp. 224-225. 
47 IFI, ‘Consolidated Report into the Death of Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali’, Cm 9324, September 2016, para. 7.10. 
48 See e.g. Nathan Rasiah, ‘The Court-martial of Corporal Payne and Others and the Future Landscape of International Criminal Justice’, (2009) 7 (1) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 177. 
49 R v Payne (Bulford, UK), cited in Rachel Kerr, ‘The UK in Iraq and the ICC: Judicial Intervention, Positive Complementarity and the Politics of 
International Criminal Justice’ in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds), Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 1, (Torkel Opsahl 
Academic EPublisher: Brussels, 2018) 451, pp. 487-488: Appendix 2. In the same chapter, for discussion, see pp. 462-463. 
50 Rasiah (2009), supra n. 48, p. 177. 
51 Information based on the absence of the case number (IHAT 153) from the published list of concluded investigations, and the statement by Mark 
Warwick to the High Court on 19 September 2016, stating that this case has been allocated to full investigation and remains ongoing. A Freedom of 
Information request on the status of the case is pending with the Ministry of Defence, for updated information, see 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/list_of_cases_under_dsp_review. 
52 MoD blog , ‘IHAT: What it is and what it does’, 13 January 2016, available at https://modmedia.blog.gov.uk/2016/01/13/ihat-what-it-is-and-what-
it-does/. ‘The IHAT is to investigate the specific cases which the United Kingdom now has an obligation to investigate following the judgment in July 
2011 of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Al-Skeini.’ Set out in the terms of reference of IHAT on 1 May 2012, and quoted in R (Ali 
Zaki Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence (No. 2) [2013] EWHC 1412 (Admin) (24 May 2013) para. 26. 
53 [2011] EWCA Civ 1334.  
54 Ibid. 
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Lawyers pursued another judicial review, challenging the independence of the reformed IHAT in R 
(Ali Zaki Mousa and others) v Secretary of State for Defence (No. 2), which led to a High Court ruling 
on 25 May 2013 that brought about further reforms of IHAT.55 Among other issues, the High Court 
decided that a High Court Judge (Mr Justice Leggatt) should be appointed to oversee the judicial 
processes relating to abuse by British troops in Iraq. Justice Leggatt, who held a number of case 
management hearings between 2014-2017, has provided oversight of the timeliness and effectiveness 
of all parts of the process.56 
 
Decisions by the ECtHR have impacted the way British courts have approached questions relating to 
IHAT’s independence – and hence the various re-structuring of IHAT over the years. Notably, In Al-
Skeini v United Kingdom, the ECtHR held that human rights law applies to the Iraq war and 
occupation in situations where UK forces were an occupying force or when they had custody over an 
individual and that the RMP investigations were not sufficiently independent to satisfy the standards 
in the Convention.57  
 
IHAT was set up prior to the ICC’s re-opening of the preliminary examination in 2014 and was 
initially not intended to function as a mechanism of complementarity. However, once the ICC 
Prosecutor re-opened the preliminary examination, IHAT was portrayed by British authorities as a 
process that ought to lead the ICC Prosecutor to terminate the preliminary examination with reference 
to the complementarity principle. For example, statements by the MoD noted that ‘without IHAT’s 
vital work, our Armed Forces would be open to referral to the International Criminal Court – 
something this Government is determined to avoid.’58 
 
IHAT’s mandate was to review allegations, investigate those deemed credible, and decide which 
cases should then be referred to the SPA for further consideration for prosecution. Rather than 
considering systemic issues – and potentially investigating those responsible – IHAT appears to have 
almost exclusively focused on the conduct of individual soldiers.  
 
In order to assist IHAT, the SPA established a stand-alone Iraq Historic Allegations Prosecution 
Team (IHAPT).59 The SPA, headed by the DSP, works independently from the military chain of 
command.60 IHAT was required to consult the DSP before a final decision was made that there was 
insufficient evidence to bring a charge, and it was the SPA that had the responsibility for the final 
decision as to whether there was a case for prosecution.61 The DSP would only direct a prosecution 
to be brought if it was satisfied that there was a realistic prospect of conviction and that it is in the 
public and service interest to bring charges.62  
 
At its peak, IHAT had 147 staff, 127 of whom were employed via the recruitment firm Red Snapper.63 
There appears to be five processes or ‘pillars’ to the work of IHAT, as set out in the Calvert-Smith 
                                                 
55 R (Ali Zaki Mousa and others) v SSD (No. 2) [2013] EWHC 1412. The details are discussed in Jonathan Horowitz and Steve Kostas, ‘Case Watch: 
British Judges Raise Standards for Investigating Wartime Abuses’, in Open Society Foundations, 29 May 2013, available at 
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59 See Sir David Calvert-Smith, ‘Review of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team’, 15 September 2016, para. 4.8. 
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Forces Act 2006’ (Chapter 52), 8 November 2006, which addresses issues relating to jurisdiction, offences, modes of liability, investigation and 
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Report: initial assessment and recording, pre-investigation, allocation of resources, investigation, 
post-investigation.64 However, an official communication by the UK to the Council of Europe 
provides different information on the stages of the IHAT investigation. It notes that there were eight 
stages: initial information gathering; assessment of the information gathered; joint consideration with 
the SPA, investigation (including victims and witnesses) through to completion and referral for a 
prosecution decision or disciplinary action.65  
 
IHAT investigations have cost well above £50 million.66 IHAT had an initial caseload of 165 cases, 
but between November 2014 and April 2015 it received a large number of additional cases, which 
led to the extension of its mandate first to December 2016 and then to December 2019.67 Based on 
the official figures, IHAT received a total of around 3400 allegations of potentially criminal 
behaviour. Out of these, 2470 originated from the work of PIL and 718 from Leigh Day.68 However, 
Leigh Day subsequently clarified that they only directly referred 15 cases to IHAT, the remainder 
being referred by the MoD in response to civil claims brought by the law firm.69 At its closure, IHAT 
reported that it had decided not to pursue 1,668 allegations after an initial assessment, while 40 still 
had to undergo preliminary evaluation; 34 investigations, involving 108 victims, were ongoing; and 
that it had closed, or was closing, 700 allegations.70 
 
IHAT has referred only two cases to the SPA for prosecution, but the SPA decided not to proceed 
with either of them. Two cases were referred to the Royal Air Force for further investigation but have 
been since closed, and one soldier was referred to his commanding officer for disciplinary action and 
was fined £3,000.71 Accordingly, IHAT investigations have not led to a single prosecution for war 
crimes in Iraq.  
 
With reference to continuing concerns as to the length and expense of the process, in April 2016, the 
Attorney General directed Sir David Calvert-Smith, a retired judge and former director of public 
prosecutions, to conduct an independent review of IHAT. Sir Calvert-Smith’s final report, published 
in September 2016, concluded that IHAT would be able to finish its work by the end of 2019 if the 
report’s recommendations were implemented and if there was ‘no further surge of new 
applications.’72 
 
In February 2017, the Common’s Defence Committee, which had for long been critical of IHAT’s 
performance, published a report, Who guards the guardians?, which concluded that IHAT had proven 
‘unfit for purpose’, and had become a ‘seemingly unstoppable self-perpetuating machine, deaf to the 
concerns of the armed forces, blind to their needs, and profligate with its own resources.’73 The 
Defence Committee recommended that IHAT be closed, in part because it was unconvinced that the 
ICC would ‘commit to investigate such a large case load which is based, to a great extent on 
discredited evidence.’74 In April 2017, then Defence Secretary Michael Fallon announced that he had 
decided that IHAT would close in June 2017 and the service police should complete investigations 
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into the small number of remaining cases a year earlier than planned.75 IHAT was permanently shut-
down on the stipulated date of 30 June 2017. As of 1 July 2017, the remaining investigations were 
integrated into the service police system and taken over by a new investigative unit, the SPLI.76 
 
SPLI, led by a senior Royal Navy Police Officer, comprises 40 Royal Navy Police (RNP) and Royal 
Air Force Police (RAFP) personnel,77 supported by a small number of civil servants and contractors.78 
SPLI inherited cases from IHAT, and one referral from IHAT to the SPA. The referral has since been 
discontinued by the SPA.79 Moreover, most remaining allegations of ill-treatment have been 
discontinued during 2017-2018.80 There is very limited public information on the structure and 
management of SPLI.  
 
b) The Iraq Fatality Investigations (IFI) 
 
The IFI was established following a High Court ruling in R (Ali Zaki Mousa) v Secretary of State for 
Defence (AZM2), which held that the fatality investigations conducted by IHAT which were 
discontinued should be followed up where necessary with a coronial inquest, which involves the 
families of the deceased and considers the wider circumstances to the extent required by Article 2 
ECHR.81  
 
Once the IHAT or SPLI, in conjunction with the SPA, decides that there is no realistic prospect for 
prosecution, a case is passed on to the MoD. The Secretary of State for Defence then decides whether 
or not the case should be referred to IFI, as set out by the High Court in AZM2.82 The decision is made 
on a case-by-case basis.83 Communication by the UK to the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe in 2016 elaborates the test, stating ‘if a death occurred within the jurisdiction of Article 1 
ECHR, and there is an arguable or credible allegation that it amounts to a breach of Article 2 ECHR 
(i.e. the circumstances of the incident are incompatible with international humanitarian law), then it 
must be referred to IFI if the IHAT investigation does not lead to a prosecution.’84  
 
At the end of an inquiry, the Inspector produces a report in which he sets out his findings. The report 
aims at satisfying two objectives, namely providing: 1) ‘a narrative account’ of the immediate 
circumstances in which the death occurred; and 2) an examination of the wider circumstances in 
which the death occurred and any lessons which should be learned.85  
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c) Public inquiries and judicial reviews 
 
A separate category of cases aim, as Rachel Kerr notes, ‘not at ensuring individual criminal 
responsibility but at ensuring institutional accountability at the level of the state.’86 These cases, 
brought by British lawyers acting for Iraqi civilian claimants, sought to require the Government to 
conduct inquiries into alleged unlawful killing, abuse and mistreatment of Iraqi civilians. The claims 
were brought under the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the ECHR into English law. 
Altogether, 13 judicial review cases relating to abuses Iraq have been brought in British courts.87 
 
The UK Government initiated two public inquiries related to allegations of ill-treatment and unlawful 
killing by British troops in Iraq. One concerned Baha Mousa. The Baha Mousa Inquiry report, 
published in September 2011, pointed to ‘corporate failure’ by the British Army as a reason for the 
use of banned interrogation techniques.88 The report also suggested that prohibited interrogation 
methods may have been widespread.89 
  
In November 2009, the UK launched a second public inquiry to investigate allegations of torture and 
unlawful killing of Iraqis during a battle in 2004. Although pointing to some mistreatment, as noted 
above, the Al-Sweady Inquiry report, published in December 2014, rejected the most serious 
allegations of murder of Iraqi detainees as being ‘wholly without foundation and entirely the product 
of deliberate lies, reckless speculation and ingrained hostility.’90  
 
The Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) referred both PIL and Leigh Day to the Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) over their involvement in the Al-Sweady inquiry. Lead lawyer of PIL, 
Phil Shiner, admitted to a number of counts of misconduct relating to paying Iraqi middlemen to find 
claimants and was convicted for this by the SDT, whereas Leigh Day was cleared of all charges.91 
Government officials, the pro-military establishment and parts of the media were quick to draw the 
conclusion that because Shiner was guilty of misconduct, the cases brought by PIL and hence the 
majority of cases before IHAT were flawed. Defence Secretary Michael Fallon stated after Shiner’s 
conviction: ‘Justice has finally been served after we took the unprecedented step of submitting 
evidence on his abuse of our legal system. Phil Shiner made soldiers’ lives a misery by pursuing false 
claims of torture and murder – now he should apologise. We will study any implications for 
outstanding legal claims closely.’92  
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II.3 The International Criminal Court’s preliminary examination  
 
a) Overview of the ICC process 
 
The UK ratified the ICC Statute on 4 October 2001 and almost simultaneously passed the 
International Criminal Court Act.93 Although Iraq is not a State Party, the ICC can exercise 
jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory by British nationals since the UK is a State Party.94  
 
In 2006, the ICC Prosecutor declined to open an investigation concerning alleged abuses by UK 
soldiers in Iraq on the ground that the number of crimes did not meet the gravity requirement under 
the ICC Statute.95 On 10 January 2014, the ECCHR together with PIL submitted additional 
information to the Prosecutor, alleging the responsibility of UK military personnel for war crimes 
involving systematic detainee abuse in Iraq from 2003 until 2008.96 ECCHR and PIL’s January 2014 
submission consisted of a 250-page document with detailed factual and legal analysis of alleged war 
crimes in Iraq by British service personnel.97  
 
In May 2014, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced that her Office had decided to re-open the 
preliminary examination.98 She noted that the 10 January 2014 communication by ECCHR and PIL 
provided further information that was not available to the Office in 2006, emphasising that it ‘alleges 
a higher number of cases of ill-treatment of detainees and provides further details on the factual 
circumstances and the geographical and temporal scope of the alleged crimes’.99  
 
In June 2015, PIL submitted a second communication,100 which, in the words of the ICC Prosecutor, 
added ‘substantively’ to the allegations contained in the first communication, including expanding 
the list of alleged crimes in relation to new cases of alleged detainee abuses and providing additional 
information in support of the allegations.101 Whereas the first communication had ‘focused entirely 
on detainee abuse’ and was comprised primarily of an analysis of ‘85 Judicial Review cases involving 
over 100 victims of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment,’ the second 
communication specified that the number of cases had reached a total of 1268 and that they 
collectively ‘demonstrate a pattern of systemic abuse and command responsibility for the War Crimes 
alleged.’102 In addition to the issues covered in the first communication, the second communication 
also included allegations of denial of a fair trial, rape, sexual violence, degrading and humiliating 
treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity, and addressed what PIL considered an inadequate 
domestic response from the UK, particularly IHAT’s investigations failing to lead to a prosecution 
of a single person and its delay in reaching a decision on the death of Baha Mousa.103 
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As detailed below, in November 2017, the Prosecutor progressed the preliminary examination to 
‘Phase 3’, meaning that the focus is now on admissibility, including complementarity and gravity.  
 
b) Focus of the preliminary examination 
 
The focus of the Iraq/UK examination is limited to crimes allegedly committed by British service 
personnel. The preliminary examination involves an inquiry into two main forms of war crimes, 
namely (1) abuse of detainees (including torture and other forms of ill-treatment, rape and other forms 
of sexual violence); and (2) unlawful killings.104
 
 
 
The submissions made by ECCHR and PIL suggest that detainee abuse was systematic. The argument 
put forward was that criminal responsibility ‘may attach all the way up the chain of command to the 
Chief of Defence Staff,’105 on the basis that they ‘knew or consciously disregarded information about 
the abuse of Iraqi detainees by UK Services Personnel in Iraq’.106
 
The submission suggests that in the 
apparent absence of detailed regulation of interrogation techniques in Iraq, the ‘limits of interrogation 
were, in effect, set by those responsible for training the interrogators’.107
 
The OTP’s official reports 
do not specify whether, and if so how, the Office is examining whether the crimes were the result of 
plans or policies, direct orders from – or omissions by – the military or political leadership, though 
the mandate of the ICC – which focuses on the persons with greatest responsibility – would suggest 
that ordinary soldiers are not its main preoccupation. 
 
In its November 2017 report on preliminary examination activities, the Office indicates that it has 
found ‘a reasonable basis to believe that in the period from 20 March 2003 through 28 July 2009 
members of the UK armed forces committed the following war crimes against persons in their 
custody, including: wilful killing/murder (article 8(2)(a)(i) or article 8(2)(c)(i)), torture and 
inhuman/cruel treatment (article 8(2)(a)(ii) or article 8(2)(c)(i)), outrages upon personal dignity 
(article 8(2)(b)(xxi) or article 8(2)(c)(ii)), and rape or other forms of sexual violence (article 
8(2)(b)(xxii) or article 8(2)(e)(vi)).’108 The Office noted that ‘there is no reasonable basis to believe 
that war crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court were committed by British armed forces in the 
course of their military operations not related to the context of arrests and detentions.’109  
 
With the preliminary examination in phase 3, the admissibility assessment is ongoing, but the 2017 
report provides limited information on how this assessment is progressing. Both the 2015 and 2016 
reports on preliminary examinations noted that the ‘Office is in particular mindful that domestic 
proceedings involving a judicial review of the [IHAT] activities are taking place in the UK.’110 
 
c) Evaluation of information providers 
 
In its 2016 report on preliminary examination activities, the Prosecutor reported that it had undertaken 
a ‘rigorous independent evaluation of all relevant sources in its possession and in particular a 
thorough assessment of the seriousness of the information provided under Article 15 [of the ICC 
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Statute] and the reliability of the senders.’111 The Prosecutor also stated that for this purpose, the 
Office had ‘researched open sources such as findings and decisions of domestic and regional bodies 
as well as national public inquiries in order to identify any relevant corroborative or corrective 
information’.112 In the same report, the Office noted that it was ‘mindful of issues affecting in 
particular the reliability of the providers of information, including the closing-down of PIL, allegedly 
as a result of disruption of legal aid funding for breach of contractual requirements with the national 
competent agency; and allegations of misconduct against the PIL and other groups representing 
Iraqi’s claimants in the UK, leading inter alia to an investigation before the Solicitors Regulation 
Authority (SRA) and the subsequent referral of both PIL and Leigh Day to the Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal (SDT).’113 The Office emphasised that it has ‘closely scrutinized and will continue to keep 
abreast of relevant developments at the national level in the context of the proceedings before the 
SDT’.114  
 
In the 2017 report on preliminary examination activities, the Prosecutor reported that during its third 
mission to the UK from 13 to 14 February 2017, the Office gathered ‘further contextual and other 
information on the disciplinary proceedings against Phil Shiner, including the views of PIL’s 
associates’.115 In this regard, the Prosecutor took note that PIL lead counsel, Phil Shiner, had been 
found guilty in February 2017 by a SDT panel of 12 professional misconduct charges and struck off 
as a solicitor, further noting that PIL had collapsed in August 2016 after the Legal Aid Agency 
revoked its contract with the firm for breach of its ‘contractual requirements’ unrelated to the 
disciplinary proceedings.116  
 
However, the Prosecutor concluded: ‘In assessing the credibility of the claims themselves, the Office 
has taken the position that individual statements received from PIL could be considered credible 
enough if substantiated with supporting material (such as detention records, medical certificates, 
photographs, etc.) and/or corroborated by information available from reliable third sources, including 
human rights reports, the findings of public inquiries in the UK and data pertaining to out-of- court 
compensation settlements or other relevant material.’117 The Prosecutor emphasised that the Office 
has paid ‘particular attention to the assessment of reliability of the sources and the seriousness of the 
information received […] Since the more recent allegations against UK forces in Iraq were mostly 
brought to the Office’s attention by only one information-provider, the Office exercised an abundance 
of care in this regard.’118  
 
d) Engagement with the UK Government 
 
The ICC Prosecutor has consistently emphasised that her Office receives full cooperation from British 
authorities. For example, in the 2016 report on preliminary examination activities, the Prosecutor 
observed that during the reporting period, the Office received ‘full cooperation from relevant 
stakeholders, including the senders of the Article 15 communications and the UK government, in 
particular when seeking additional information for the purpose of verifying the seriousness of the 
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information in the Office’s possession’.119 The 2017 report similarly states that the Office ‘is grateful 
to the UK authorities for their ongoing cooperation in the course of this preliminary examination’.120 
 
Throughout the preliminary examination, the ICC Prosecutor has remained in contact with UK 
officials to ‘verify the seriousness of the information in its possession, discuss the progress of the 
Office’s preliminary examination process, address methodological issues as well as to solicit updates 
and provision of additional relevant information’.121
 
This has involved several visits by the 
Prosecutor’s Office to the UK, including at the premises of IHAT and SPA. During these visits, the 
general progress of domestic proceedings has been discussed and ICC prosecutors have requested 
information from the UK authorities concerning the status of these processes.122  
 
e) Assurances concerning persons testifying before the IFI 
 
In a letter dated 2 December 2014, the ICC Prosecutor wrote to Sir George Newman, responding to 
a request of ‘non-use undertaking’ in relation to evidence given to the IFI investigation by soldiers 
‘alleged to have participated in the immediate circumstances leading to the deaths of two Iraqi 
nationals’. The Prosecutor informed that following a careful legal assessment of the request, it had 
come to the conclusion that such an undertaking would not violate the Office’s obligations under the 
Statute. Accordingly, the Prosecutor provided IFI with an assurance that ‘any self-incriminating 
evidence provided to the IFI by any of the soldiers alleged to have participated in the immediate 
circumstances’ leading to the deaths of two Iraqis in 2003 will not be used by her office ‘either 
directly or indirectly as incriminating evidence in any possible subsequent prosecution before the ICC 
of any soldier that provided the evidence’.123 Our understanding is that this is the only preliminary 
examination where assurances of this nature have been provided. Arguably, the undertaking is 
uncontroversial since it is based on the principle that self-incriminating statements should not be used 
against accused persons; furthermore, IFI focuses on low-level perpetrators who are unlikely to 
become suspects in a potential ICC investigation.  
 
Following consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions and the DSP, the UK’s Attorney-
General similarly provided IFI with an undertaking ‘in respect of any person who provides evidence 
to the [IFI] relating to a matter within its term of reference’. The undertaking provides that no 
evidence a person may give to the IFI will be used as evidence against that person in ‘any criminal 
proceedings save that this undertaking does not apply to any proceedings in which it is alleged that a 
person has wilfully misled the IFI or conspired with others so to do’. The Attorney-General made it 
clear that ‘evidence’ includes oral evidence, any written statement, and any document or information 
produced to the IFI solely by that person.124 
 
In his progress report of 12 March 2018, Sir George Newman stated:  
 
I shall seek assurances from the Attorney General and other prosecuting authorities, including the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court, that evidence given to me by any individual will not be used against that 
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individual in any future criminal proceedings. In addition, it should be noted that, before a reference can be made 
to me to investigate, it must be clear that there will be no prosecution. Taken together, these circumstances are 
likely to make any attempt, made subsequently to my investigation, to prosecute, vulnerable to being declared 
an abuse of process. The comfort which the above assurances should provide is designed to encourage, in the 
public interest, a full investigation enabling Parliament, the media, and the public generally to be informed about 
the circumstances of a death. 125 
 
f) Current issues relating to the assessment of complementarity 
 
The ICC Prosecutor has made a range of comments relating to domestic legal mechanisms in the UK, 
including from the perspective of the Court’s complementarity regime. 
 
In the 2016 report on preliminary examination activities, the Office stated that its analysis of the 
crime basis ‘drew extensively from the findings of two domestic inquiries, respectively into the death 
of an Iraqi civilian in UK custody (Baha Mousa inquiry) and allegations of unlawful killings and ill 
treatment of Iraqi nationals by British troops in Iraq in May 2004 (Al Sweady inquiry)’.126 The Office 
emphasised that the inquiries ‘provided credible and documented information on the context of 
alleged crimes, the military units involved and the UK military chain of command during the relevant 
time periods, as well on the factual circumstances of a specific set of alleged incidents of abuse in 
custody’.127 
 
Although the ICC Prosecutor’s assessment was at the time focused on issues of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, the same report noted that ‘the Office has also received and considered information on 
the progress of ongoing relevant national proceedings’, emphasising that the Office ‘is in particular 
mindful that domestic proceedings involving a judicial review of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team 
(IHAT) activities are taking place in the UK.’128 The 2016 report further noted that the Office ‘will 
continue to be in close contact with relevant stakeholders, including the UK government, in order to 
exchange views on relevant aspects of the Office’s preliminary examination process’ and to ‘closely 
observe the activities and findings of ongoing national proceedings by the UK authorities as well as 
the periodic developments of judicial review proceedings in the High Court of Justice of England and 
Wales relevant for the entire preliminary examination process of the situation in Iraq/UK.’129 
 
The Office provides only limited information regarding the assessment of complementarity in the 
2017 report on preliminary examination activities. However, the report observes that the conduct of 
British troops in Iraq has ‘generated a wide array of proceedings before civilian and military 
authorities, including courts martial, civil and criminal cases, as well as judicial and public 
inquiries.’130 The report also states that the Office ‘received and considered information on relevant 
national proceedings conducted by the UK authorities, in particular with respect to the incidents of 
criminalities identified’, and that in so doing, the Office ‘maintained regular contact with the 
appropriate interlocutors, including the Service Prosecution Authority and IHAT, senior staff of both 
agencies, and other relevant State officials’.131 The report concludes that the ‘Office’s admissibility 
assessment is ongoing and is intended to be completed within a reasonable time frame.’132  
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Beyond that, the 2017 report makes a range of comments concerning the closure of IHAT and the 
transition to SPLI. The ICC Prosecutor notes that during its third mission to the UK in February 2017, 
the Office received ‘updated information from the IHAT on the progress of their investigations amidst 
the decision of UK Defence Secretary to close IHAT ahead of the original scheduled time frame’.133 
The Prosecutor further notes that on the same day of the release of the report by the Defence 
committee that recommended IHAT be closed, the Defence Secretary announced, ‘amid concerns of 
political interference’, the closing of IHAT ahead of the originally scheduled time frame, ‘citing 
IHAT own forecasts that the unit’s caseload was expected to reduce to around 20 investigations by 
the summer 2017’.134 The Prosecutor further makes clear that the Office has ‘closely scrutinised’ the 
transition between IHAT and its successor, the SPLI, ‘to gauge the effective continuity between the 
two entities in terms of corporate knowledge, procedures, expertise, and judicial oversight’.135 
 
g) Standards for the ICC Prosecutor’s assessment of complementarity in phase 3 of the 
preliminary examination  
  
The ICC Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations commits the Office to take active 
steps to encourage domestic proceedings, stating that where potential cases falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Court have been identified, the Office ‘will seek to encourage, where feasible, 
genuine national investigations and prosecutions by the States concerned in relation to these 
crimes’.136 Although as follows from the analysis above, the Prosecutor has in some ways already 
actively engaged with national investigatory and prosecutorial mechanisms in the UK, such and other 
activities aimed at promoting a complementary justice process are likely to intensify in phase 3 as the 
Prosecutor operates with a so-called ‘phased approach’.137  
 
The Policy Paper states that the Prosecutor’s policy of investigating and prosecuting those ‘most 
responsible for the most serious crimes’ means that the Office’s efforts towards encouraging genuine 
national proceedings at the preliminary examination stage will ‘centre on potential cases that fall 
within the ambit of this policy, without being limited to those cases’.138 
 
The Prosecutor’s admissibility assessment is informed by standards in the ICC Statute as well as the 
Office’s Policy Paper. These standards clarify that the Office will rely on a two-fold test whereby any 
assessment of ‘unwillingness’ or ‘inability’ according to Article 17 of the Statute takes place only if 
it is first established that there is relevant investigatory or prosecutorial ‘activity’ in the State 
concerned.139 The determination of whether there is relevant activity involves an assessment of 
‘numerous factors, including the absence of an adequate legislative framework; the existence of laws 
that serve as a bar to domestic proceedings, such as amnesties, immunities or statutes of limitation; 
the deliberate focus of proceedings on low-level or marginal perpetrators despite evidence on those 
more responsible; or other, more general issues related to the lack of political will or judicial 
capacity.’140  
 
Should the ICC Prosecutor conclude that there is relevant activity in the UK, the Office will examine 
the standard of ‘unwillingness’. This involves an assessment of whether (a) the proceedings were or 
are being undertaken for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility 
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for crimes within the ICC jurisdiction, (b) there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings 
which in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice, and 
(c) the proceedings were or are not conducted independently or impartially and in a manner consistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.141  
 
With respect to delays, the Prosecutor’s assessment involves indicators such as ‘the pace of 
investigative steps and proceedings; whether the delay in the proceedings can be objectively justified 
in the circumstances; and whether there is evidence of a lack of intent to bring the person(s) concerned 
to justice’.142
 
 
 
With respect to ‘independence’, the Prosecutor will consider factors such as ‘the alleged involvement 
of the State apparatus, including those department responsible for law and order, in the commission 
of the alleged crimes; the constitutional role and powers vested in the different institutions of the 
criminal justice system; the extent to which appointment and dismissal of investigators, prosecutors 
and judges affect due process in the case; the application of a regime of immunity and jurisdictional 
privileges for alleged perpetrators belonging to governmental institutions; political interference in the 
investigation, prosecution or trial; recourse to extra-judicial bodies; and corruption of investigators, 
prosecutors and judges.’143 
 
II.4 UK Government response to the ICC and broader approach to accountability 
 
The UK Government has responded in multiple, partly contradictory, ways to the re-opening of the 
Iraq/UK preliminary examination. The Government has stated its support for the Court and intention 
to co-operate with the ICC Prosecutor.144 At the same time, it has made it clear that it believes the 
preliminary examination should be closed. In so doing, it cites to three separate grounds: (1) the Court 
lacks jurisdiction since the crimes were not committed on a sufficiently large scale; (2) the existence 
of judicial measures in the UK which address crimes in Iraq renders the situation inadmissible under 
the ICC Statute’s complementarity regime; and (3) the information that the preliminary examination 
is based on is not credible.145  
 
Further, UK authorities have proposed to derogate from human rights law so that it no longer applies 
to situations of armed conflict.146  
 
Most recently, driven by concerns in the military about the Iraq investigations, investigations of 
abuses in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, a debate has emerged about enacting a statute of limitations 
extending to all previous conflicts, to protect service personnel from a ‘vicious cycle of investigation 
and re-investigation.’147 At the time of writing, the Common’s Defence Committee was still 
considering the options. 
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III. KEY AREAS FOR ANALYSIS  
 
III.1 THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS 
 
Investigations into allegations concerning wrongful deaths, torture and other forms of ill-treatment 
must be effective. The ECtHR makes this clear in its jurisprudence on Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. 
In particular, those responsible for carrying out the investigation must be independent from those 
implicated in the events; the investigation must be ‘adequate’; conclusions must be based on 
thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements; the investigation must be 
sufficiently accessible to the victim’s family and open to public scrutiny; and it must be carried out 
promptly and with reasonable expedition.148  
 
In Kelly v United Kingdom, the ECtHR specified that an investigation into a wrongful death must be 
capable of establishing the cause of death and the identification of those responsible with a view to 
their punishment. But it is a test of means as opposed to ends:  
 
[t]he authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the 
incident, including inter alia eye witness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which 
provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings, including the 
cause of death. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death 
or the person responsible will risk falling foul of this standard.149  
 
Nevertheless, positive investigative obligations should ‘be interpreted in a way which does not 
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities’.150  
 
a) Independence and impartiality  
 
The requirements of independence and impartiality, including hierarchical, institutional and practical 
independence are a sine qua non of an effective investigation which is itself crucial to comply with 
the positive obligation to protect individuals from serious crimes, particular unlawful killing and 
torture and ill-treatment.151 The case law establishes that an investigation must be undertaken by a 
person or body independent of the State agents who may bear responsibility for the violation.152 
Investigations must be independent and seen to be independent. 
 
In Ali Zaki Mousa v SSD No. 1,153 the Court of Appeal determined that IHAT investigations were not 
sufficiently independent because of the inclusion of members of the Provost Branch of the Army (the 
Royal Military Police) in the investigation of matters where that Provost Branch had been involved 
in Iraq. Following that judgment, certain changes were instituted, in particular, the Royal Military 
Police were replaced with the Royal Navy Police headed by the Provost Marshal (Navy) and more 
retired officers from civilian police forces were added. Also, the DSP and SPA were given a greater 
role.154 
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In Ali Zaki Mousa v SSD No. 2,155 the issue of independence and impartiality of IHAT was again 
canvassed. The Divisional Court held that with the changes that had been instituted, IHAT 
investigations were sufficiently independent, taking into account the procedural obligations required 
by Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention. Crucial to the Court was that it saw ‘no 
objection in principle to a service police force investigating service personnel of the service which 
they police or another service police force. The only question is whether on the facts of a given case, 
the service police is independent of the events or personnel being investigated,’ nor with ‘[t]he fact 
that the service police forces work together in other matters or share some facilities ..., [this] does not 
affect the ability of one of the forces to investigate another’.156 Furthermore, the Court expressed its 
satisfaction that ‘neither the Ministry of Defence nor the Royal Naval command nor any part of the 
hierarchy of the armed forces have or will have any influence whatsoever on his decisions including 
his decisions as to investigation or prosecution.’157 
 
Following the closure of IHAT and the transfer of pending cases to the SPLI and a number onward 
to the IFI, there is a question whether the structures of these bodies are sufficiently independent both 
in theory and in practise to satisfy the requirements of the European Convention. As explained earlier 
in this discussion paper, the SPLI is comprised of RNP and RAFP personnel and is led by a senior 
Royal Navy Police Officer. Decisions that a particular case has no realistic prospect of a criminal 
conviction are taken by SPLI in conjunction with the SPA. These decisions are then passed on to the 
MoD. This leaves the main decision making to the ‘more neutral’ SPLI and DSP, and provides the 
MoD with only a minimal ‘rubber-stamping role’ at the end of the process. Nevertheless, close 
institutional links between the investigatory bodies and the MoD appear to remain in place. 
 
The IFI has a more limited mandate in that it does not consider or determine an individual’s liability; 
it receives cases and terms of reference through the Secretary of State for Defence. The SPA and SPLI 
are sources of evidence for the IFI.158  
 
As set out below, several concerns about the independence of investigatory bodies have been raised 
in the course of our research. 
 
A first concern is the public statements that have been made by both the former Defence Minister and 
the current and former Prime Minister about IHAT investigations and claimant lawyers. As a general 
matter, it is inappropriate for the executive to comment on ongoing judicial proceedings as it gives 
the impression of the executive interfering in the work of the judiciary. Numerous judgments and 
other texts make clear that improper commenting on ongoing criminal proceedings can be 
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence.159 This is directly relevant to the disciplinary 
proceedings against solicitors and their firms described elsewhere in this discussion paper, but 
arguably, the impropriety extends beyond comments made about the guilt of accused persons. In 
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innocence would be violated if public statements made by public authorities, or judicial decisions other than those on guilt, referred to a suspect or an 
accused person as being guilty, for as long as that person has not been proved guilty according to law. Such statements and judicial decisions should 
not reflect an opinion that that person is guilty.’ [para. 16]. 
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serious cases where by law there is an obligation to carry out an effective investigation, commenting 
on the lack of utility of an investigation and the unfounded nature of the allegations has a chilling 
effect on the investigation and is inconsistent with the obligation to investigate serious crimes such 
as wrongful death, torture and other ill-treatment.  
Numerous statements have been made by government and military officials, politicians and others 
about the ‘industry of vexatious claims’ and the ‘spurious’ allegations, ‘false claims’, ‘claims that are 
totally without foundation’ brought by ‘ambulance-chasing lawyers’ from ‘parasitic law firms’ 
against ‘our brave troops’; with some comments noting these firms are ‘the enemy of justice and 
humanity, not our armed forces or the Ministry of Defence.’160 Such statements are unfortunate, 
irresponsible and may have been intended to influence proceedings, given the then ongoing 
disciplinary proceedings against several solicitors and solicitors firms, and the then ongoing IHAT 
investigations, though any suggestion of improper influencing has been ‘rejected utterly’ by the 
Government.161 Martyn Day, whose firm Leigh Day and some of its solicitors were also brought up 
on misconduct charges which the Solicitors Regulatory Tribunal determined not to be founded,162 
indicated at the time of the verdict: ‘I have always felt that the SRA, whether directly or indirectly, 
was influenced by the political background to the case [...] It was clear that the government took a 
very strong interest in the prosecution – both of Phil Shiner and us […] And the fact that [the MoD] 
said it was “disappointed” by the [tribunal] outcome is an indicator. It was totally inappropriate. It 
was an outrage that the prime minister was putting the boot into us at the time that the regulator was 
investigating us. [Ministers] said we were bringing spurious claims but 90% of them were settled.’163 
The Government’s statements have fostered a climate of deep suspicion. As Samira Shackle noted in 
her detailed exposé on the subject, ‘the tone of public discourse had become so partisan that any who 
questioned the actions of British troops were cast as unpatriotic traitors, while the armed forces were 
valorised by the very same institution that had, in the words of Johnny Mercer, been tempted to throw 
them “under a bus”.’164 
Other statements were made at various times about the need to close down IHAT as soon as possible, 
often making reference to the fact that IHAT was only in place to satisfy the ICC that the UK was 
meeting its obligations under the ICC Statute, and would be closed as soon as the preliminary 
examination was clear to close.165 This would have contributed to immense pressure on investigators 
to expedite the closure of cases.  
 
Second, there is a suggestion that reputational risks to the armed forces – at least as a matter of 
principle – were a factor that could have been taken into account in decision-making by investigative 
bodies, in deciding whether or how to proceed with an investigation. In February 2018, the terms of 
reference which transferred a matter to the IFI were amended: ‘Where it appears to the Inspector a 
risk exists that the public reputation of the armed forces could be adversely affected by the outcome 
of his investigations he should consider whether he should receive representations in connection with 
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that risk.’166 There is no suggestion that the receipt of representations could as such, impede the 
independence of this judicial body. Nevertheless, the paragraph suggests that ‘reputational risks’ are 
seen as an appropriate consideration in the fact-finding process. This was of some concern to the 
research team, for instance if reputational risks were to be used as a rationale to limit the public 
disclosure of the IFI findings. There is no suggestion that this has so far happened in practice, 
however.  
 
Third, some questions have been raised about some of the assistance functions of the MoD. The MoD 
established the investigative structures, provides an array of administrative support to the relevant 
units and is also a link to locating military witnesses. Samira Shackle relays the impressions of several 
former IHAT employees she spoke with, who claimed that there was pressure to shut down 
investigations prematurely; however these claims were denied by an MoD spokesperson.167  
 
b) Robust investigations 
 
Investigations must be sufficiently rigorous so as to be capable of leading to the truth and where 
appropriate, the prosecution of the suspects.168 Authorities must have taken the reasonable steps 
available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, such as witness 
testimony and forensic evidence.169 Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its 
capability of establishing the circumstances of the case or the person responsible is liable to fall foul 
of the required measure of effectiveness.170 This is not an obligation of result but nevertheless, a weak 
investigation that does not adequately explore all reasonable leads will not be effective.  
 
Both the quality and scope of the investigation are relevant factors to consider. There is no suggestion 
in our research that the officials of IHAT, SPLI or IFI were or are less than fully diligent in their 
investigations. In respect of IHAT, the charge was one of over-zealousness as opposed to lack of 
diligence, but also that the IHAT investigators were without specialist knowledge or understanding 
of the military context.171 However, sometimes this ‘diligence’ resulted in other effectiveness 
problems – particularly certain inefficiencies in the investigative process of IHAT resulted in an 
overly lengthy process.172 Sometimes their work was impeded by other factors, most of which were 
outside their control – the sometimes limited information accompanying claims and weak initial 
investigations carried out before these bodies were established. As Lewis Cherry, military law 
solicitor, noted, in a session with the Defence Committee:  
 
Lewis Cherry: For some of the people, probably the only wrongness about this is the delay in bringing it. 
Prosecutions should have been brought much nearer to the date. I have acted in some cases where there have 
been absolutely clear instances of prisoner abuse that were not prosecuted at the time and I was astonished—
absolutely astonished. One case was abandoned by the Service Prosecuting Authority. Actually, a second case 
during the running of the Baha Mousa war crimes trial—I was told it was stopped and I was astonished, because 
the evidence was even better than that available at the Baha Mousa trial. It got dropped, but I fully expect that 
it is going to reopen. I see no reason why it should not and that is why I am expecting some calls. 
 
These prosecutions and investigations should have been done in 2003 and 2004 and should have been coming 
to trial in 2005, not 10, 11 or 12 years later and so it runs on. We have not even touched the bottom of 
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Afghanistan yet. There is currently an investigation team being formed to investigate Afghanistan issues and I 
have again advised people as to where we are going to go and what might happen. 
… 
 
Q28 Mrs Moon: If they should have been brought to trial by 2005, why have they not been? What caused the 
delay? 
 
Lewis Cherry: Lack of proper investigation. To be fair, it was very difficult in those circumstances for the 
service police to gather the normal sort of investigation that we would expect out on the ground, because we 
did not control the ground. It is very difficult to do a forensic follow-up after a shooting in a disturbed area. 
Let me put it in these terms: people were winning Victoria Crosses out on the ground. Trying to gather the 
information as to what took place at the time when VCs are being awarded gives you a fair idea of just how 
difficult it might be. Those are the sort of problems they faced. I am aware of prisoner abuse cases that took 
place inside the barracks, where there is photographic evidence of what went on, and I am astonished that they 
have not been brought earlier.173 
 
Another factor, at least for IHAT, is the fact that the work was impeded by the difficulties in many 
cases to secure direct witness evidence – particularly victim witness evidence from Iraq. Sir David 
Calvert-Smith has noted: ‘The current situation in which the Mensa [overseas investigations] process 
is in abeyance is the biggest single obstacle in the way of completing the IHAT process in time and 
would be biggest single problem facing the UK government in defending its handling of the issue in 
either the Divisional Court or an international tribunal.’174  
 
Evidentiary presumptions have been used to weed out allegations perceived to be weak or 
unsubstantiated. This was a sound approach in general terms, given the large numbers of allegations. 
However, it is questionable whether all the rationales for dumping cases were appropriate given the 
seriousness of the allegations. In a court ruling on 7 April 2016, it was determined that as a general 
rule IHAT could ‘properly decline to investigate such an allegation unless it is supported by a witness 
statement which is (i) signed by the claimant, (ii) gives the claimant's own recollection of the relevant 
events, (iii) identifies any other relevant witness known to the claimant and the gist of the evidence 
which the witness may be able to give, and (iv) explains what, if any, steps have been taken or 
attempts made since the incident occurred to bring it to the attention of the British authorities.’175 
This ruling may seem appropriate on its face but must be considered in context. PIL, who represented 
the bulk of the victims, ceased its representation of Iraqi victims only a few months after the ruling 
in August 2016 when its offices closed. Ever since, the bulk of the victims have been unrepresented, 
so it would have been virtually impossible for witness statements which did not satisfy the ruling to 
be rectified. As noted above, as of 31 March 2016, there were 1374 cases under consideration by 
IHAT.176 In our view, steps should have been taken, such as appointing a ‘duty-counsel’ 
representative, to aid the victims to rectify their witness statements. There is no indication that any 
steps were taken to assist victims in this or any other way. 
 
In addition, ‘lower-level incidents of ill-treatment’ were progressively weeded out of IHAT. On 24 
October 2016, investigations into 489 lower-level allegations of ill-treatment were discontinued, as 
it was deemed ‘not proportionate’ to maintain the investigations. A further 68 allegations were 
discontinued for the same reasons on 19 September 2016. A number of other cases were discontinued 
because of insufficient evidence; others because it was not considered proportionate to investigate 
further given the length of time that had passed.177  
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Additional rationales to close cases have become apparent in more recent times, post IHAT. On 12 
June 2018, for instance, the Secretary of State for Defence decided to close hundreds of cases because 
of all or some of the rationales below: 
 
1. The combination of the criminal investigation undertaken by IHAT and SPLI and the oversight provided by 
the High Court in this case – including the availability of judicial review and civil proceedings in respect of any 
alleged ill-treatment – satisfies any Article 3 ECHR obligation which might arise.  
2. No evidence was identified or provided to support the allegations. The possibility of obtaining further evidence 
which is relevant to the circumstances of the alleged ill-treatment in this case is low. The Secretary of State 
therefore considers that the costs of further inquiries outweigh the potential benefits.  
3. The case does not highlight issues that are of such seriousness or ongoing importance that it is necessary to 
conduct further inquiry in order to learn lessons from it.  
4. In addition to the above principal reasoning, some, albeit limited, reliance is placed upon the concerns that 
have emerged from the disciplinary action that has been taken against Mr Phil Shiner of Public Interest 
Lawyers.178 
 
The research team finds the bulk of these rationales to be of concern, for the following reasons: 
 
In relation to the first rationale, as already set out, an effective investigation must be capable of 
establishing the truth and punishing the wrongdoers.179 That other avenues have been pursued does 
not necessarily obviate the need for a criminal prosecution. A criminal prosecution serves a particular 
purpose and should be assessed on its own terms, on the basis of the cogency of the evidence. 
 
Clearly an absence of sufficient evidence will make a prosecution impossible. The cost implications 
of further inquiries are but one consideration which should be taken into account, alongside the 
gravity of the alleged incidents. The primary consideration should be the likelihood of obtaining 
further evidence and the prospects of a successful criminal prosecution. There is no data provided to 
be able to scrutinise the assertions made about the low likelihood of further evidence, including what 
steps had already been attempted. In normal circumstances, the victims would have the opportunity 
to respond to such assertions. There is no indication whether victims have been informed and 
provided an opportunity to make representations, but this seems unlikely given what was noted about 
the absence of legal representation following the closure of PIL. Mr Justice Leggatt noted in Al-
Saadoon, when setting out his views about how to weed out weak cases, that ‘it is appropriate to ask 
at an early stage whether there is a realistic prospect of obtaining sufficient evidence to charge an 
identifiable individual with a service offence. If it is clear that the answer to this question is “no”, 
there can be no obligation on IHAT to make any further enquiries.’180 However he added:  
 
[i]n some cases where the answer is not immediately clear, it may well be possible to identify one or more limited 
investigative steps which, depending on their outcome, may lead to the conclusion that there is no realistic 
prospect of meeting the evidential sufficiency test. Examples of such steps might be carrying out a documentary 
search or interviewing the complainant or a key witness. It goes without saying that it will be a matter for the 
judgment of the Director of IHAT in any particular case how the test formulated by the DSP is applied.181  
 
It is not clear whether the 12 June 2018 decisions to close investigations carried out any documentary 
search or interviewed the complainants. Furthermore, following the closure of IHAT, it is unclear 
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who ultimately took the decision to close investigations – the SPLI, SPA or the MOD. The 
communication on the closure of investigations was made by the Secretary of State for Defence.  
 
Criminal prosecutions are normally pursued because there is evidence that a particular individual 
committed a crime. In our view, although it is a legitimate concern, whether an allegation will 
‘highlight issues that are of such seriousness or ongoing importance that it is necessary to conduct 
further inquiry in order to learn lessons from it’ is not a factor that should determine whether a 
criminal case is pursued. A ‘lessons learned’ approach would normally be pursued alongside or in 
addition to any criminal prosecution, but a criminal prosecution is not necessarily the most suitable 
vehicle to use to foster such learning.  
 
Making an adverse finding on the cogency of evidence because of the disciplinary action that has 
been taken against Phil Shiner of PIL is problematic. The SSD qualifies its statement noting that 
‘some, albeit limited reliance’ is placed on this ground. However, in August 2017, counsel for the 
MoD noted that ‘the disciplinary proceedings surrounding Mr Shiner in the Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal, which have been a catalyst for changes in the way that the IHAT investigative strategy has 
worked. That is likely to lead to a substantial increase in the tempo at which cases are terminated.’182 
The disciplinary finding should have no bearing on the credibility of the victims Mr Shiner 
represented which should be assessed on their own merits. Many of the individuals that had been 
represented by Mr Shiner were recognised by UK courts to have suffered heinous abuses. This 
includes but is by no means limited to Shiner’s work on the ill-treatment and death of Baha Mousa 
and most recently, the findings of the High Court in the matter of Alseran and Others v Ministry of 
Defence.183 Just because PIL gathered the evidence, this does not self-evidently mean that a case is 
fundamentally flawed ab initio. 
 
The scope of investigations was also limited in several respects, which appears to have been 
detrimental to achieving accountability for those most responsible for the alleged crimes.  
 
Importantly, the investigations do not appear on their face to have made any attempt to go up the 
chain of command. This may reflect a broader problem in the UK that commanders and the senior 
military leadership are rarely, if ever, held to account. As Samira Shackle notes in her exposé for The 
Guardian, ‘the last person in Britain to be prosecuted for crimes committed by forces under their 
command was in 1651 during the civil war.’184 She relays her discussion with ‘Paul’, a retired police 
detective who worked as an investigator: ‘Wanting to investigate the chain of command, in one case, 
he requested permission from IHAT’s leadership to interview a senior army officer in relation to an 
alleged unlawful killing. This was refused. Every time he tried to pursue this line of inquiry, he claims 
that it was shut down by IHAT’s leadership or MoD lawyers.’185 ‘Paul says’: ‘I felt the MOD were 
putting pressure on the senior leadership to wrap things up.’186 
 
Further – but related to the above – investigations appear to have been construed narrowly. IHAT 
was established with a mandate to investigate cases involving death or alleged ill-treatment of Iraqi 
civilians in British custody. This was later widened to include some cases involving the allegedly 
unlawful killing by British soldiers of Iraqi civilians who were not in custody. In Mr Justice Leggatt’s 
2015 decision in the Al-Saadoon case, he held that the duty to investigate allegations of a violation 
of Article 3 (torture and ill-treatment) only applies in cases where the nature of the allegation is that 
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the claimant was tortured or mistreated by British forces.187 In other words, allegations that an 
individual was handed over to United States or Iraqi authorities in circumstances where there was 
allegedly a real risk that they would subject the claimant to torture or mistreatment were understood 
as outside the boundaries of the cases which needed to be investigated.188  
 
In 2016, the UK Government explained to the United Nations Human Rights Committee that:  
 
The IHAT is aware of allegations that UK Armed Forces personnel transferred detainees into the custody of, or 
were present during interrogations by, US Forces at Camp Nama and other so-called “black sites”. However, it 
has not yet been able to identify Camp Nama with a particular location. This is because a number of the facilities 
operated by US Forces were known by various designations, and the IHAT’s investigation has not yet progressed 
to a point where these different names can be unambiguously resolved. If the IHAT assesses that the allegations 
are credible, and that there are viable and proportionate lines of enquiry available, these will be investigated in 
accordance with its investigative strategy.189 
 
The June 2018 Intelligence and Security Committee report into detainee mistreatment and rendition 
noted: 
 
8. Under domestic law, ‘complicity’ in torture or CIDT means any involvement in torture or CIDT. (Under 
domestic law relating to secondary liability and joint enterprise, an individual may be prosecuted – as if they 
were the principal offender – for an offence that is carried out by another if they aid, encourage, counsel or 
procure the commission of an offence.) This is particularly relevant, as most allegations of UK involvement in 
mistreatment of detainees relate to facilitating, supporting or assisting others in that mistreatment. Complicity in 
torture or CIDT might result from, for example, sharing intelligence in the knowledge or belief that action might 
be taken on that intelligence with a real risk that torture or CIDT would result.  
 
9. Conspiracy to commit offences outside the UK (an agreement by two or more people to carry out such a 
criminal act) is also an offence under domestic law. This might include, for example, prosecutions of pilots, 
aircrew or aircraft owners with knowledge of the fact that a flight carried a person likely to be subject to an 
offence in another jurisdiction (such as kidnapping, false imprisonment, assault or torture).190 
 
In this respect, it is also relevant to consider the ruling of the ECtHR in the case of El Masri v Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,191 which concerned a German national who when in Macedonia, 
was handed over by the authorities to the CIA outside of any legal process, and was thereafter taken 
to Afghanistan where he was subjected to harsh interrogation techniques and unlawfully detained. 
The Grand Chamber held that: 
 
192. The Court considers that the prosecuting authorities of the respondent State, after having been alerted to the 
applicant’s allegations, should have endeavoured to undertake an adequate investigation in order to prevent any 
appearance of impunity in respect of certain acts. The Court does not underestimate the undeniable complexity 
of the circumstances surrounding the present case. However, while there may be obstacles or difficulties which 
prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, an adequate response by the authorities in 
investigating allegations of serious human rights violations, as in the present case, may generally be regarded as 
essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance 
of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts. For the same reasons, there must be a sufficient element of public 
scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory (see Anguelova 
v Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, § 140, ECHR 2002-IV; Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom [GC], no. 
55721/07, § 167, ECHR 2011; and Association 21 December 1989 and Others v Romania, nos. 33810/07 and 
18817/08, § 135, 24 May 2011). As the Council of Europe stated in its Guidelines of 30 March 2011 on 
eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations (see paragraph 105 above), “impunity must be fought 
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as a matter of justice for the victims, as a deterrent to prevent new violations and to uphold the rule of law and 
public trust in the justice system”. The inadequate investigation in the present case deprived the applicant of 
being informed of what had happened, including of getting an accurate account of the suffering he had allegedly 
endured and the role of those responsible for his alleged ordeal.  
 
193. In view of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the summary investigation that has been 
carried out in this case cannot be regarded as an effective one capable of leading to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible for the alleged events and of establishing the truth.  
 
194. Against this background, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, in 
its procedural limb. 
 
Mr Justice Leggatt distinguishes the El Masri case, holding that ‘the breach of the procedural aspect 
of article 3 found by the Court related to the failure to investigate Mr El-Masri’s criminal complaint. 
The subject matter of that complaint was his “ill-treatment by state agents and their active 
involvement in his subsequent rendition by CIA agents”: it was this “prima facie case of misconduct 
on the part of the security forces of the respondent State” which warranted an investigation.’192 
However this is arguably a matter which should be revisited in light of the findings of the Intelligence 
and Security Committee in its report on detainee treatment and rendition.193  
 
With respect to the truth-telling functions of investigations, UK courts have determined that an 
inquisitorial process (which in this case became the IFI) was appropriate for Article 2 cases, however 
it was held that there was no need to establish a comprehensive inquiry into abuse allegations.194 The 
work of the IFI is limited to Article 2 (allegations of wrongful death) cases, though in certain limited 
circumstances its investigations may go wider if there are facts related to other abuses which bear 
upon the Article 2 cases.195 Cases of torture and other ill-treatment do not fall within the remit of the 
IFI because they are not Article 2 cases. Thus, any case of torture or other ill-treatment which did not 
result in death or was not connected to allegations of wrongful death would not benefit from an 
inquisitorial inquiry, once the criminal investigations were discontinued. However, the matter was 
kept open: ‘Once it is determined that there are cases in which there will be no prosecution, the 
procedure for Article 3 cases should be reviewed by the Secretary of State in the light of the 
experience in the Article 2 cases; it may well be possible to conduct the inquisitorial inquiry into 
these cases by taking a sample of the more serious cases.’196 In order to fulfil its ‘lessons learned’ 
exercise and to comply with victims’ right to truth, an inquisitorial process should be instituted for 
Article 3 cases.  
 
c) Prompt investigations 
 
Investigations must be reasonably prompt. Prompt investigations are important for both the suspect 
who requires legal certainty and the victims and their families who have a right to know the truth of 
what happened and, where appropriate, obtain reparations. What constitutes ‘prompt’ will depend on 
the complexity of the circumstances being investigated. Consideration has been given in the 
jurisprudence to matters such as the opening of investigations, delays in identifying witnesses or 
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taking statements and the length of time taken for the initial investigation.197 In the case of McDonnell 
v United Kingdom, the ECtHR determined that: 
 
whatever the individual responsibility, or lack of responsibility, of those public officials involved in the 
investigation process, these delays cannot be regarded as compatible with the State’s obligation under Article 2 
to ensure the effectiveness of investigations into suspicious deaths, in the sense that the investigative process, 
however, it be organised under national law, must be commenced promptly and carried out with reasonable 
expedition. To this extent, the foregoing finding of excessive investigative delay, of itself, entails the conclusion 
that the investigation was ineffective for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention. There has, accordingly, 
been a violation of Article 2 under its procedural aspect by reason of excessive investigative delay.198 
 
Structural issues resulting in inefficiencies and delays in the IHAT investigative process were 
comprehensively addressed in the report by Sir David Calvert-Smith.199 Structural issues relating to 
IHAT were also considered in Ali Zaki Mousa v SSD No. 2,200 where the Divisional Court raised a 
number of concerns about the effectiveness of the IHAT investigative process. A key concern was 
timeliness, with the Court noting that the investigations were both lengthy and time-consuming. 
Given the large number of claims involving incidents occurring at many different times and in 
different locations, the Court judged it to be unlikely that IHAT would be able to complete its mandate 
without undue delay.201 Because of these and other issues, the Court expressed concern that the UK 
was not effectively discharging its investigative obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the European 
Convention. It determined that in a large portion of the cases, there was not a realistic prospect that 
persons would be held criminally responsible for the deaths of Iraqis.202 Consequently an additional 
approach was proposed by the Divisional Court which focused on more streamlined inquiries on the 
model of coroner’s inquests to investigate cases where a duty of investigation arises in Article 2 cases; 
matters were to be referred to such a process as appropriate, once the prospects for a criminal 
investigation were exhausted. This is what prompted the establishment of the IFI.203  
 
Concerns about delays in criminal investigations continued to be the subject of comments by judges. 
For instance in the Al-Saadoon case, Mr Justice Leggatt noted that over one and a half years after the 
Divisional Court in Ali Zaki Mousa v SSD No. 2 had emphasised the ‘need for urgent and realistic 
decision-making’ on three specific ‘category 2’ cases under investigation by the IHAT, the final 
decision was still yet to be made.204 Further, in relation to seven ‘category 3’ cases, only two 
investigations had been concluded. He described this state of affairs as ‘deeply disappointing’.9 In 
2017, Mr. Justice Leggatt again comments on inordinate delays with the conclusion of investigations, 
referring specifically to the Baha Mousa investigation:  
 
I have got one [question] which relates to the reference to the Baha Mousa investigation still carrying on. I 
appreciate that I know nothing about the details of the investigation but it does seem to me that on the face of it, 
and I will try to avoid superlatives, but it is difficult to understand why almost six years after a major public 
inquiry was finished in 2011 there has still been no resolution of the question whether to prosecute anybody in 
relation to Baha Mousa. I think people would find that, on the face of it, extraordinarily difficult to understand.205 
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Concerns about delays in criminal investigations have also been expressed by Parliament,206 by the 
media,207 and others.  
 
d) Transparent investigations 
 
The transparency of investigations – whether criminal investigations, inquiries or other forms of 
processes – is important so that lessons can be learned and faulty practices rectified as well as to give 
proper public oversight of governmental activity which is necessary in any democracy. Transparency 
is also crucial to ensure the fairness of proceedings for complainants, who have a right to know what 
happened to their complaint and to respond as appropriate, if decisions are taken to close down an 
investigation or not to pursue a prosecution. Transparency is also important for suspects and 
defendants, so that they are clear on what allegations they face and are able to defend themselves 
against such allegations. Open justice is necessary for the rule of law.  
 
When proceedings are ongoing, however, there may be reasons why certain information should be 
kept out of the public domain, particularly to safeguard the rights of accused persons, who have the 
right to be presumed innocent. As indicated earlier in this discussion paper, it is important for judicial 
officials and government authorities to refrain from commenting on the strength or weaknesses of 
allegations or cases, in order not to influence or to be perceived as influencing proceedings which 
must be independent.  
 
In the course of our research, a range of concerns relating to transparency arose which are set out 
below. 
 
First, objective information relating to the status of ongoing criminal investigations has been 
insufficient, as have the reasons why individual investigations were discontinued and decisions taken 
not to pursue prosecutions. Whereas IHAT published some limited information about cases under 
consideration, the SPLI only publishes the number of cases completed, with the SSD taking 
responsibility for publishing a case number and a short generic description (in English and Arabic) 
of the action taken. For instance, in the latest SSD statistical reports, cases are listed by number only 
with no accompanying factual summary. The Article 3 cases have a column for the decision taken; 
in each case what is listed here is simply ‘no inquiry’. There is an additional column ‘summary of 
reasons for decision’, in which generic reasons are provided (the same reasons appear in each case):  
 
1. The combination of the criminal investigation, plus the availability of a civil damages claim in respect of the 
alleged ill-treatment, satisfies any Article 3 ECHR obligation which might arise.  
2. The evidence submitted to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) and the SDT judgement in disciplinary 
proceedings brought against Mr Phil Shiner of Public Interest Lawyers (PIL) casts significant doubt upon the 
veracity and credibility of the allegations made by PIL.  
3. Taking these matters into account, the Secretary of State has decided that any investigatory obligations have 
been fully met.  
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A date is also provided for when the decision was taken.208  
 
The same opaqueness exists with the Article 2 cases, though because of the existence of the IFI, in 
some cases, a decision is taken to refer a matter for an inquisitorial inquiry.209 Also, discrepancies in 
the names of victims and numbering systems has made it difficult, often impossible, to track the 
progress of cases, thereby undermining the public function of such proceedings. The opacity of the 
investigations has impeded transparency and, arguably, public oversight. A significant gap is 
understanding the full grounds for closing down specific investigations, which have not been 
explicitly and coherently laid out. 
  
Second, as pointed to by the SIWG, there is a need to ensure that full and accurate contemporaneous 
records are produced and preserved in accordance with MoD records management policy. Among 
other flaws, the Working Group identified instances of incomplete log books and radio logs, 
difficulties for investigative bodies to locate photographs and other records relating to the treatment 
of certain detainees, incomplete records of actions taken in response to certain incidents, and the 
routine destruction of ‘written materials once the tasks to which they related were complete, as a 
consequence of which they will not be available to Service Police investigations or inquiries.’210 Such 
conduct is enormously problematic from a rule of law perspective. In IFI’s investigation into the 
death of Nadheem Abdullah, Sir George Newman noted that he made exhaustive inquiries about the 
whereabouts of the transcript of the court martial trial in respect of the death of Mr Abdullah but 
concluded that it was not available and that it had, probably, in all its previous forms, including as a 
disk, been destroyed or thrown away.211 In the research team’s follow up queries to Sir George 
Newman, he indicated that ‘Court martial transcripts are sometimes not available as they may have 
been destroyed after a number of years in line with an institution’s record keeping policies.’212  
 
The computer database known as AP3 Ryan at Camp Bucca was taken out of active use in 2008, and 
‘inadequate steps were taken to preserve the records held on it, despite the fact that this litigation was 
already in prospect. … When disclosure of documents was given in these proceedings [Alseran v 
SSD], the MoD did not disclose the existence of the data stored on this laptop and disclosed only 
print-outs of data which had come from the AP3 Ryan database but is now held on a system called 
the Defence Archive System (DAS). Because the DAS does not run the AP3 Ryan software, the data 
stored on the DAS is displayed in a different format which is much harder to interpret and has some 
fields missing.’213 Also at Camp Bucca, the first several hundred detainees on ‘the list of detainees’, 
have as the ‘date of capture’ 28 March 2003 in every single case. In some cases, the date of release 
shown is earlier than 28 March 2003.214 Whether intentional or not, the factors pointed to here have 
in all likelihood contributed to the subsequent findings of investigative bodies that the evidential 
sufficiency test was not met.  
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Third, the decision not to pursue an overarching inquiry into abuse allegations has limited the public’s 
access to balanced information. In Ali Zaki Mousa v SSD (No. 2), the judges reminded that the purpose 
of the IHAT inquiry was limited: ‘[L]ike a police inquiry, [IHAT] has not been an inquiry accessible 
to the public of the broader issues of State responsibility for the death, including the instruction, 
training and supervision given to soldiers undertaking such tasks. There are cases where there will be 
no prosecution, for the reasons we have given, and it is therefore necessary that there be an inquiry 
accessible to the public. IHAT is neither structured nor staffed to do this.’215 The decision to establish 
the IFI was important for public disclosure purposes, but IFI has not addressed all cases involving 
allegations of unlawful death and is not mandated to address cases relating to torture or other ill-
treatment matters, nor is or was any other public inquiry (other than the narrowly-focused Baha 
Mousa inquiry). 
  
Fourth, it is also problematic that there has been insufficient reporting to and scrutiny by Parliament 
concerning the extent to which, and how, the UK’s investigative obligations under Articles 2 and 3 
of the ECHR were being met. In certain cases, reporting to Parliament has been selective, and calls 
have been made for officials to clarify or correct faulty evidence. This happened with information 
provided to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the prohibition of hooding and on the training 
of interrogation personnel:  
 
We have yet to receive an explanation from the Ministry of Defence for the discrepancies between the evidence 
given to the Joint Committee in 2004 and 2006 on the use of prohibited conditioning techniques and the facts 
which have emerged from the Payne court martial and the Aitken report. … We recommend that, in response to 
this Report, the Secretary of State for Defence should confirm we will receive a detailed explanation of the 
discrepancies.216  
 
In his written response to the Joint Committee, Lord Goldsmith QC noted:  
 
The RMP and the Army Prosecuting Authority (APA) have strongly expressed the view that it would be 
inappropriate at this time to release witness statements, associated exhibits and other documents (not given in 
evidence during the trial) which are being considered as part of the police formal criminal review of the case 
(Payne – Baha Mousa).217 
 
Finally, the efforts made by this research team to obtain official information from Government 
ministries and officials were largely rejected or delayed to the point where they had not yet provided 
at the time of writing this discussion paper, with minimal exception. Our request to interview the 
head of the SPA or designate, or to obtain written answers to questions, was refused. A similar request 
to the SPLI was declined. Freedom of Information Act requests to the MoD which concerned a list 
and status of cases currently under DSP review, and the status of particular investigations, were 
delayed and not yet provided at the time of writing this discussion paper, on the basis of the belief 
that qualified exemptions applied: 
 
we believe the information falls within the scope of the following qualified exemption(s): section 30 
(Investigations). As such it is necessary for us to decide whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the public 
interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure.218  
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Our request for the list and status of cases currently under SPLI review,219 decisions of the DSP not 
to bring charges in several IHAT cases,220 as well as the Final Closing Reports for several IHAT cases 
were delayed and not yet provided when writing this discussion paper for the same reason.221 
Similarly, our request to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for details on the responses of the 
Government to the ICC Prosecutor on the preliminary examination concerning the situation in Iraq 
was delayed on the basis of the need to consider whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs 
the applicable qualified exemption to disclosure, and not yet provided to the research team at the time 
of writing.222  
 
e) Victims’ rights in the investigation 
 
Victims of criminal offences have a range of rights during criminal proceedings that States are obliged 
to safeguard. The victim, or where he or she did not survive, the victim’s next of kin, must be involved 
to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests.223 The Directive 2012/29/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the 
rights, support and protection of victims of crime, requires inter alia that Member States ‘take 
appropriate measures to assist victims to understand and to be understood from the first contact and 
during any further necessary interaction they have with a competent authority in the context of 
criminal proceedings, including where information is provided by that authority.’224 Furthermore the 
Directive requires that Member States ensure that ‘victims are notified without unnecessary delay of 
their right to receive’ ‘any decision not to proceed with or to end an investigation or not to prosecute 
the offender’225 which should include ‘reasons or a brief summary of reasons for the decision 
concerned, except in the case of a jury decision or a decision where the reasons are confidential in 
which cases the reasons are not provided as a matter of national law.’226  
 
In accordance with their role in the relevant criminal justice system, victims should have the right to 
a review of a decision not to prosecute; victims must be notified without unnecessary delay of their 
right to receive, and that they receive sufficient information to decide whether to request a review of 
any decision not to prosecute upon request.227 These rights are consistent with the Ministry of 
Justice’s ‘Code of Practice for Victims of Crime’.228 
 
In Ali Zaki Mousa v SSD (No. 2), the Court determined, referring to the Al Skeini case before the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR,229 that ‘[t]he investigation must be public and accessible to the 
victim’s family.’230  
 
Sir David Calvert-Smith commented in his report about the difficulties with victim interviews:  
 
For the UK/MoD/FCO to go to a domestic or international tribunal having unreasonably delayed or, even worse, 
failed to provide access, when such access was available, to its justice system to the key people, namely victims 
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and eye-witnesses etc. of incidents involving death or ill-treatment, would be impossible to defend. The current 
situation in which the Mensa process is in abeyance is the biggest single obstacle in the way of completing the 
IHAT process in time and would be biggest single problem facing the UK government in defending its handling 
of the issue in either the Divisional Court or an international tribunal.231  
 
At the end of August 2016 when PIL closed down, this effectively ended the legal support available 
to the vast majority of Iraqi victims which had engaged in the criminal investigation process. For the 
most part, no other solicitors firm has assumed representation for the majority of victims. Mr. Justice 
Leggatt, who has judicial oversight of the investigative process through periodic hearings in the Al-
Saadoon case, did not have the benefit of victim learned counsel submissions post August 2016.232 
In other scenarios, when a claimant firm dissolves, the SRA can step in to preserve the position of 
the victims, particularly where the matter is urgent or where there are vulnerable victims. They do 
not appear to have done so following the closure of PIL.233 
 
Largely for budgetary and logistic reasons, IHAT and later SPLI, stopped individually informing 
claimants in Article 3 cases concerning ill-treatment (as opposed to torture) that their investigations 
were being discontinued. This was reported to Mr Justice Leggatt by learned counsel for the MoD in 
the course of the Al-Saadoon hearings: 
 
… The costs of doing that [individual notification to all claimants] in every single case have simply become too 
prohibitive. The Iraq-based representatives charge between $30 and $50 per letter to be delivered and the sums 
vastly increase if we are talking about, for example, all the Article 3 cases. So the position that IHAT has adopted, 
and we hope that this is satisfactory, is that they will continue to write individually in any unlawful killing and 
serious ill treatment cases subject to full investigation.234 
 
Prior to this approach, victims whose claims were discontinued were provided with individual written 
notifications explaining in some detail the decision to discontinue and the basis upon which it was 
taken. The new approach of website notification provides much more limited information, assumedly 
making it difficult for victims to understand why the evidentiary threshold was not met or other 
pertinent information. The various websites provide only cursory information. The IHAT last updated 
table of completed cases provides grouped information by claim numbers which offers some limited 
information about the reason for discontinuance. Sketchy information is provided for the more recent 
decisions to discontinue in 2016, whereas earlier notifications of decisions to discontinue provide 
more detail and also note in some cases that IHAT investigators had communicated the decision 
directly to family members.235 SPLI data is much more limited still. In a document entitled 
‘Information for Claimants’,236 there is a generic statement at the top reproduced below. Thereafter 
there is simply a list of numbers, next to which it simply states ‘proportionality’:  
 
Please use your unique number to find your case. If it is listed below, it has been closed. 
 
CLOSED (proportionality): You made a complaint about the conduct of UK Armed Forces in Iraq. This 
complaint has been carefully considered by SPLI, an independent investigative unit. It has been decided to close 
your case, without further action, as there is a lack of evidence of a serious criminal offence. It is also not 
considered proportionate to investigate further given the length of time that has passed. 
 
                                                 
231 Sir David Calvert-Smith, ‘Review of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team’, 15 September 2016, para. 13.8. 
232 See, e.g., Al-Saadoon & Ors v Secretary of State for Defence & Ors, Hearing before Mr Justice Leggatt, 8 June 2017, Transcript (on file). 
233 See, the website of the Solicitors Regulation Authority: https://www.sra.org.uk/faqs/contact-centre/public/06-interventions/urgent-case.page.  
234 Al-Saadoon & Ors v Secretary of State for Defence & Ors, Hearing before Mr Justice Leggatt, 8 June 2017, Transcript (on file), para. 78; see 
generally, paras. 78 – 80. 
235 IHAT, untitled and undated document, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/649525/20171003-
IHAT_NEW_master_copy_website_work_completed_table-HQComms_O.pdf.  
236 SPLI, ‘Information for Complainants Table’ (undated), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/741041/20180913-
SPLI_Information_for_complainants_table_UPDATE.PDF.  
  41 
CLOSED (Lack of evidence): You made a complaint about the conduct of UK Armed Forces in Iraq. This 
complaint has been carefully considered by SPLI, an independent investigative unit. It has been decided to close 
your case, without further action, as there is a lack of sufficient, credible evidence of a criminal offence. This 
decision also took into the account findings against UK solicitors involved in legal proceedings concerning 
military operations in Iraq.’  
 
f) Defendants’ rights 
 
Defendants have rights that need to be respected as part of a criminal investigation. Inquiries must 
respect their dignity and right to be presumed innocent if and until they are found guilty by a court of 
law. Defendants have the right to know the case against them so that they can fully defend their 
interests and have the right to be represented by counsel. People suspected or accused of criminal 
offences who are being questioned have the right to the presence and assistance of a lawyer.237 They 
also have the right to remain silent should they so choose, with no adverse inferences made.238 
Soldiers naturally would expect to be supported through any investigative process by the MoD, to 
ensure their rights are respected.  
 
The situation of army soldiers who have been subjected to Iraq-related interrogations, often numerous 
times over a span of years, has been difficult and problematic. According to Hilary Meredith, the poor 
support for service personnel investigated for historic allegations is a key cause of mental health 
conditions in those affected:  
 
It is hard to comprehend the psychological horrors faced by British soldiers wrongly investigated by IHAT. 
Throughout the process there was an almost total disregard for their mental welfare. One veteran refused to leave 
his house because he “lost all faith in anybody outside the walls of his home” as a result of a lack of support 
from the MoD. Others were left suicidal.239  
 
Soldiers who have experienced trauma and/or have symptoms linked to PTSD will have certain 
vulnerabilities which should be taken into account in the manner the interrogations are carried out; 
this is important not only to avoid exacerbating any existing trauma but because the state of 
vulnerability can simply require a higher duty of care. To interview individuals who suffer from 
PTSD or other trauma-related symptoms requires special skill and care, and specific training. Trauma 
can affect a witness’ ability to recall key events in logical sequence. It can also impact behaviour, 
speech patterns and body language.240 It is important for investigators to be sensitive to such cues in 
order to avoid making adverse or incorrect inferences that stem from a traumatised soldier’s reactions 
to questioning. 
 
Evidence submitted to Parliament sets out that soldiers called upon by investigative bodies have been 
insufficiently supported by the MoD. The Defence Committee has expressed that:  
 
[w]e are deeply concerned that the MoD’s package of support for service personnel appears to be fragmented, 
inaccessible and largely unknown. The MoD must, as a priority, devise and publish a single, accessible 
framework which sets out the MoD’s responsibilities and the support soldiers and veterans can expect to receive. 
That framework must be widely publicised and understood throughout the chain of command.241 
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Concerns have been raised about the inordinate degree of scrutiny that soldiers and ex-soldiers have 
faced – an ‘endless process of investigation and reinvestigation’242 which has been unfair to them and 
has negatively impacted morale. Concerns have been expressed about use of intimidating and 
unethical tactics and IHAT investigators approaching suspects and witnesses unexpectedly, outside 
of the chain of command. The MoD has indicated that over 300 potential witnesses, and seven 
suspects, were contacted without prior warning. These approaches, often years after the incidents, 
can cause a lot of anxiety to ex-soldiers trying to move forward with their lives.243 Ex-soldiers can be 
particularly vulnerable; ‘in the absence of the chain of command, veterans were “out on their own, 
on a limb”.’244  
There is also legitimate concern that junior soldiers have been somehow scapegoated when they were 
sent to theatre with inadequate training, particularly on interrogation techniques. Numerous public 
inquiries have concluded that five banned interrogation techniques were widely used by British 
service personnel in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. These techniques – hooding, white noise, sleep 
deprivation, food deprivation and stress positions – were outlawed by the UK in 1972 and breach the 
Geneva Conventions. During the beginning of the Iraq war, however, training manuals did not 
mention that these techniques were forbidden. Nor did the manuals formally advocate using these 
techniques – they simply were not mentioned at all.245 The absence of a comprehensive inquiry into 
Article 3 cases obscures the role of Government in the areas of planning, training and guidance. 
 
The Defence Committee is considering whether putting in place a statute of limitations for 
investigations may be the most appropriate way to deal with the real challenges that soldiers and 
former soldiers have faced in being confronted with multiple and repeated investigations over many 
years. The research team has submitted evidence to the Committee setting out that to do so would not 
be consistent with the UK’s legal obligations.246 Instead, we argue, the best route for the Government 
to pursue would be to increase the capacity and commitment for efficient, transparent and effective 
investigations that comply with procedural obligations and which are capable of weeding out quickly 
any spurious or clearly unfounded claims, and strengthening the capacity for robust, timely and 
transparent investigations where credible allegations are raised. Naturally there will be a mixture of 
quality in allegations made as there is with all criminal complaints. Strengthening investigative 
capacity would be the best way to protest soldiers from legal uncertainty and ensure full compliance 
with the UK’s legal obligations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
III.2 ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SYSTEMIC ISSUES  
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The notion of ‘systemic’ implies something which is ‘basic’, experienced by the whole of the 
organisation or body being analysed as opposed to just a part of it.247 The MoD SIWG has explained 
its use of the term ‘systemic issues’ as follows: 
 
The term “systemic issues” primarily envisages shortcomings of doctrine, policy, training, or supervision that 
result in unintentional breaches. It encompasses inter alia situations where an individual has complied with policy 
and training, but these have been flawed; where policies issued at different levels have been contradictory, 
leaving individuals unable to determine whether their actions are correct; and where supervision has been 
insufficient to identify and address such confusion, or failure to understand and apply training correctly. 
Deliberate acts by individuals in knowing contravention of the law and of doctrine, policy or training are not 
systemic issues, and are punishable through the Service Justice system.248 
 
The narratives surrounding the alleged crimes committed by UK military personnel in Iraq have 
focused in part on two differing perspectives. The first perspective is that of the few ‘bad apples’ who 
overstepped or acted outside the bounds of the law.249 The second perspective – of which there are 
several variants – is the existence of ‘systemic’ problems which led to or fostered the abuses – 
institutionalised failures in training, oversight, patterns of abuse, and inadequate investigations or in 
its second variant (which is connected to the first variant) – that the abuses themselves were systemic.  
 
This second perspective (both variants) is prevalent amongst those who have called for broad-based 
inquiries capable of uncovering systemic issues to learn from past practice and institute the necessary 
changes to avoid recurrence.250 It is also prevalent in the ethos and working methods of the SIWG. 
Additionally, this second perspective is relevant to debates about the jurisdiction of the ICC. The 
focus of the ICC Prosecutor is on cases of sufficient gravity (for which the scale of abuses is one of 
a number of relevant criteria) concerning persons who bear the greatest responsibility (this tends to 
involve investigations of persons higher up the chain of command or political leadership). In the 
communication to the ICC Prosecutor, ECCHR and PIL stated that ‘what at first appears to be a series 
of random acts begins to form a clear pattern of systematic abuse’,251 which ‘may attach all the way 
up the chain of command to the Chief of Defence Staff’.252 Thus, the ‘few bad apples’ narrative 
arguably helps to deflect attention away from systemic issues which may engage the criminal 
responsibility of those higher up the chain of command as well as the institutional responsibility of 
the MoD. This also feeds into the argument that the inordinate attention placed on individual soldier 
abuses is misplaced.253  
 
The systemic nature of abuses and the chain of command has been raised repeatedly with regards to 
military operations overseas, in particular in Iraq and Afghanistan.254 The chief legal military adviser 
in Iraq raised concerns of systemic use of unlawful interrogation methods such as hooding, in 2003, 
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concerns which were then passed up to ministerial level in March 2003.255 It was not until September 
2003 that new operating directions were issued, which explicitly stated that the use of hooding was 
banned.256 Apparently, a similar order had been given by the General Officer Commanding 1 (UK) 
Armoured Division in Iraq during April 2003 but this direction was lost when responsibility was 
handed over to 3 (UK) Armoured Division in July 2003.257 
 
The degree to which it has been accepted that there might be systemic issues requiring attention has 
evolved over time. Some of the evolution has occurred as a result of the findings of criminal 
investigations which were passed on to the SIWG for its consideration, as well as civil court 
judgments. For instance, in 2013, the High Court held in R (Ali Zaki Mousa) v Secretary of State for 
Defence (No. 2), that ‘there might have been systemic abuses and that such abuses may have been 
attributable to a lack of appropriate training’.258 In its 2018 report, the SIWG concluded that ‘[i]n 
light of the Court’s findings [in Alseran & Others v Ministry of Defence, 2017], the SIWG considered 
that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that assaults in detention had occurred, and may have 
been systemic’.259  
 
Much of the evolution, however, stems from the detailed findings of Sir William Gage as part of the 
Baha Mousa Inquiry. He determined that there was:  
 
a systemic failure within the MoD that had, in practice, allowed knowledge of the 1972 Directive [which 
prohibited the usage of the Five Techniques] and the Heath Statement to fade even amongst intelligence staff 
and, more surprisingly, had permitted knowledge of the current interrogation policy which only dated back to 
1997 to have been almost completely lost. To this extent […], the MoD did not have a grasp on, or adequate 
understanding of, its own interrogation policy […].260  
 
Sir William Gage considered that the ‘main fault for the inclusion of inappropriate training and/or 
exclusion of appropriate material [was the result of] a systemic failure over a number of years’,261 in 
particular, ‘failures:(1) to have in place adequate doctrine to which the branch should teach; (2) to 
recognise the proper significance of aspects of the Geneva Conventions, such as the prohibition on 
insults, even though I accept that key Geneva Convention provisions were taught on the course; and 
(3) to have a proper legal assessment of the teaching on the courses.’262 Furthermore, he noted that 
‘the central features of this systemic failure were a wholesale lack of MoD doctrine in 
interrogation’.263 Sir William Gage also found that ministerial correspondence was ‘inaccurate to 
suggest that hooding had only been applied on a small number of occasions’.264 
 
In the Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, Sir William Gage gave 73 recommendations to rectify the 
shortcomings that led to the death of Baha Mousa, which aimed to ‘ensure better and clearer 
accountability for the welfare of captured personnel’.265 They focus on training of soldiers who deal 
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with detainees, the proper recording of events during detention, and the responsibilities within the 
chain of command for prisoners.266 The Government accepted 72 of the 73 recommendations,267 
rejecting the recommendation to impose a blanket ban on the ‘harsh’ technique or shouting in the 
face of the detainee during ‘tactical questioning’.268  
 
The SIWG, chaired by Peter Ryan, is the principal MoD body responsible for identifying relevant 
systemic issues and ensuring that effective corrective action is taken.269 Since 23 October 2012, it 
assesses any systemic issues arising from the armed forces,270 by considering whether the evidence 
from a criminal investigation has disclosed any systemic or potential systemic issues.271 Rather than 
establishing criminal accountability, the purpose of systemic issues investigations has been to map 
out failures and to learn lessons. The UK Government refers implicitly to the work of SIWG in its 
2017 report to the UN Committee Against Torture, setting out that ‘a robust process is in place for 
identifying, reviewing, and correcting areas where doctrine, policy and training have been insufficient 
to prevent practices or individual conduct that could breach the UK obligations under international 
humanitarian law, and the UKG continues to publish annual reports detailing this work.’272 A part of 
SIWG comprises the Review Group – previously the 2* Detention Steering Group273 – whose task is 
to ‘study the evidence uncovered in the course of a Service Police investigation or judicial process – 
and, in the case of a public inquiry, any findings and/or recommendations that the Chairman may 
make’274 and to request ‘additional information from subject-matter experts as necessary’.275 The 
systemic issues are recorded on the Systemic Issues Master Register of the Directorate of Judicial 
Engagement Policy.276  
 
As the SIWG does not possess its own investigative capacities, it relies on the Service Police – IHAT 
and SPLI – and public inquiries for evidence to determine the factual situation and causes of alleged 
systemic issues.277 Previously, the MoD would conduct a review of IHAT’s report on each concluded 
case, and present all issues relating to training, policy, and other matters to SIWG.278 Since SPLI has 
taken over, the process and workflow are less clearly spelled out. However, regarding low-level ill-
treatment allegations, the 2018 SIWG Report notes that since the reporting period 2016-2017, the 
Review Group and SIWG ‘have had to proceed without the benefit of [the] evidential basis as the 
Service Police had discontinued most of the allegations of ill-treatment considered during this 
reporting period without a full investigation.’279 Therefore, they have not been able to form ‘any view 
as to whether the alleged ill-treatment actually occurred or even whether the allegations were 
accurately recorded.’280 The SIWG has instead focused on reviewing the current policies in relation 
to the behaviour described in the allegation.281 
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Moreover, during 2016-2017, the MoD changed the approach for identifying systemic issues for less 
serious allegations ill-treatment.282 While previously the Review Group considered every case to 
identify any systemic or potential systemic issues, since the 2016-2017 reporting period it has 
implemented a process that ‘mirrors the “problem profiles” approach, which […] IHAT adopted’.283 
In practice, this means identifying issues ‘within those cases taken as a group’ and requesting an 
opinion of the relevant subject-matter experts of that ‘broad issue rather than of each 
manifestation’.284 Hence, most allegations of ill-treatment are not examined individually. The 
unavailability of an evidentiary basis from ill-treatment cases due to them being discontinued and the 
implementation of the adjusted approach to the identification of systemic issues arguably coincides 
with the political pressure leading up to the closure of IHAT. 
 
Systemic issues are also addressed in the work of the IFI. In early 2018, the MoD requested the IFI 
to resume wider investigation into systemic issues in the investigation into the death of Saeed Radhi 
Shabram Wawi Al-Bazooni.285 The systemic issues were first identified by Sir George Newman in 
the Jabbar Report, in which he noted: ‘it is not presently clear to what extent details of the state of 
affairs up to the 8th of May 2003 were communicated to London. This in turn raises questions about 
the extent of the knowledge of the chain of military command in Iraq as to what was happening on 
the ground.’286  
 
The implementation of many of the 72 recommendations set out in the Baha Mousa inquiry report 
that were accepted by the Government is recorded and reviewed in the reports of SIWG, and in 2013, 
the High Court in Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2) noted that the great majority of the recommendations had 
been implemented.287  
 
Some systemic issues pre-dating the Baha Mousa Inquiry Report, such as an implied death threat to 
a captured person, banging a tent pole against a table, invading the detainees’ personal space, blowing 
on their necks, and employing the so-called harshing technique, including shouting in their ears,288 
have not been the subject of an inquiry for the reason that MoD considers that ‘the systemic issues 
evidenced by these incidents had been addressed by the extensive changes to policy, training, and 
monitoring as part of the implementation of the [Baha Mousa] recommendations’.289 On certain 
systemic issues, such as the ‘need to prevent the improper use of blindfolds’ and the ‘need to ensure 
that the treatment of captured persons complies with recognised norms’, the SIWG has referred to Sir 
Thayne Forbes’ findings in the Al-Sweady Inquiry, in which he ‘had decided against making any 
recommendations in relation to this issue, accepting that it had been the subject of recommendations 
by the Baha Mousa Inquiry that have been implemented by MOD.’290  
 
In R (Ali Zaki Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence (No. 2), the court held that while it was 
important to implement lessons learnt, there was no necessity to order a public inquiry because 
‘considerable changes have already taken place in relation to policies relating to detention and 
questioning since the deaths covered by this application occurred’.291 According to the Court, this has 
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been illustrated by the implementation of most of the recommendations set out in the Baha Mousa 
Report, and with a view of possible recommendations stemming from the Al-Sweady inquiry, which 
was ongoing at the time of the Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2) decision.292 
 
The SIWG is a crucial instrument for addressing guarantees of non-recurrence, but the MoD has 
repeatedly adopted the position that for ‘the lessons learned and implemented’, systemic issues 
‘reflect a historic position’.293 Consequently, no further measures – such as criminal prosecutions – 
have arisen from the findings of systemic abuse by SIWG or IFI. Arguably this undermines the 
effectiveness of the policy changes and other measures that have appropriately been put in place to 
avoid repetition and ignores the deterrent value of criminal prosecutions. This sets a troublesome 
precedent for the accountability within the military chain of command and ministerial oversight of 
the army, leading to a few junior soldiers being ‘scapegoats’ for – at least on some occasions – 
following orders, whereas those giving the orders and other senior commanders responsible for 
creating an environment where systematic abuses may occur escape liability.294  
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IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The UK has presented an outward positive attitude to the investigations into crimes committed in Iraq 
by its military, and has established several investigate mechanisms, inquiries and other legal 
mechanisms to address these claims. Yet, despite thousands of claims of death and abuse, criminal 
accountability has so far been minimal, to say the least. Much of the information and evidence that 
has been made public points to attempts to ‘manage’ or even circumvent accountability and create an 
illusion of transparency, but with little actual substance to that effect. 
  
Whether the lack of accountability has as underlying rationale to shield soldiers, commanders and 
Government officials from legal scrutiny or is simply caused by poorly managed and ineffective 
investigations, the fact remains that the UK has so far not managed to thoroughly and transparently 
examine the alleged crimes by its troops, including issues of command responsibility. Despite 
obligations under both domestic and international law to do so, the UK can therefore not be said to 
have conducted the necessary and warranted investigations into allegations that are of an extremely 
serious nature. 
 
Rather than creating obstacles to accountability and taking aim at the lawyers – and by extension the 
victims of alleged abuses – for pursuing legal claims, we argue that the UK Government should, as a 
matter of urgency, be pursuing work to increase the capacity for efficient, transparent and effective 
investigations that comply with its obligations under domestic and international law. Such 
investigations must be capable of protecting both the interests of victims and soldiers, including by 
weeding out quickly any spurious or clearly unfounded claims and strengthening the capacity for 
robust, timely and transparent investigations where credible allegations are raised.  
 
In the following we highlight some specific findings relating to the mandate, structure and operations 
of legal processes in the UK covering the Iraq claims. 
 
Whereas domestic and international law require investigations into allegations concerning wrongful 
deaths, torture and other forms of ill-treatment to be independent and impartial, our research findings 
point to some significant challenges. The independence of UK investigative bodies examining the 
Iraq claims – in particular IHAT/SPLI – has been brought into question over time by numerous 
credible sources, including UK courts. Although some notable improvements took place concerning 
structural and personal independence following orders by UK courts, our research highlights a range 
of persistent challenges to the independence of UK investigatory mechanisms. For one, public 
statements made by Government officials commenting on the utility of Iraq investigations in general 
as well as the credibility of the information – and the providers of information – in particular has 
seriously impacted the prospects for independent and impartial investigations. What is more, the 
assistance functions the MoD has in investigatory processes, coupled with reports that the presence 
and actions of MoD officials with respect to these ostensibly independent bodies, appears to have 
impacted investigators’ perceptions of what was expected of them – and, by extension, possibly the 
outcome of some investigations. Additionally, the fact that the ‘reputational risks’ to the armed forces 
associated with investigations is seen as a factor to be taken into account in decision-making by some 
investigative bodies is of principle concern, even if there is nothing in our research that suggests such 
considerations have directly impacted any specific investigations to date. 
 
Next, there is a requirement under law that investigations must be sufficiently rigorous so as to be 
capable of leading to the truth and where appropriate, to the prosecution of the suspects. Our research 
observes that inefficiencies in the investigative process of investigative bodies is likely part of the 
explanation for what has materialised as an unreasonably lengthy process. Our research suggests that 
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investigators have, at least in certain periods, been prevented from interviewing soldiers. It also points 
to difficulties securing direct witness evidence. Further, the use of irrelevant or overly stringent 
evidentiary presumptions aimed at weeding out allegations have led to a disproportionate emphasis 
on the cost implications of investigations, excessive attention to whether investigations would 
highlight issues deemed to be of ‘ongoing importance’, and a presumption that cases brought by 
specific law firms are based on flawed or false evidence. It is also of concern that the scope of 
investigations has been limited in several respects, including with respect to examining whether 
liability reaches up in the chain of command and in terms of narrowly constructed investigations that 
focus on only certain types of violations. 
 
The UK is under an obligation to ensure that investigations are reasonably prompt to safeguard the 
interests and rights of both the accused person and victims. Up to 15 years have passed since the 
alleged crimes in Iraq took place, and yet only very few direct perpetrators – and not a single 
commander or senior official – have been prosecuted. Our research – supported by the findings of 
UK judges who have expressed concern that the country may not be effectively discharging its 
investigative obligations under human rights law – suggest that structural issues are at least partially 
to blame for the substantial delays in Iraq-related investigative processes. 
 
Although some limitations to public transparency in on-going investigations can be accepted, the 
open and transparent pursuit of justice is a key element of the rule of law. Our research points to a 
range of concerns relating to transparency in investigations. These include in particular insufficient 
publicly available information relating to the status of ongoing criminal investigations, the frequent 
failure by the MoD to preserve important records, and insufficient reporting to and scrutiny by 
Parliament concerning the investigative processes. Although public inquires and the work of IFI 
should be lauded for having contributed to some amount of transparency including around systemic 
issues, the decision taken early on by UK courts not to pursue an overarching inquiry into the Iraq 
allegations has limited the public’s access to balanced information. It is illustrative of the significant 
challenges relating to transparency concerning these matters that the various efforts made by this 
research team – relying on Freedom of Information Act requests and otherwise – to obtain official 
information from Government ministries and officials has by and far been rejected or delayed. This 
means that important information relating to the structure and progress of investigations, UK 
Government bodies’ engagement with the ICC and other key issues which are clearly of public 
interest have been unavailable to us in the context of drafting this discussion paper.  
 
Victims of criminal offences and their families have a range of rights during criminal proceedings, 
including a right to be involved in the process to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate 
interests, but investigative mechanisms in the UK addressing the Iraq claims has not managed to fully 
give effect to these principles. Importantly, since the closure of the law firm PIL in August 2016, 
legal support for most victims who have provided evidence to IHAT/SPLI effectively ended. It is also 
problematic that IHAT/SPLI stopped individually informing claimants in Article 3 cases concerning 
ill-treatment that their investigations were being discontinued. 
 
Defendants have rights that need to be respected as part of a criminal investigation, including a right 
to be presumed innocent if and until they are found guilty by a court of law, a right to know the case 
against them so that they can fully defend their interests, a right to be represented by counsel, a right 
to be present and assisted by a lawyer when questioned, and a right to remain silent should they so 
choose. Our research suggests that the situation of soldiers who have been subjected to Iraq-related 
investigations has often been difficult and problematic, in part due to insufficient support by the MoD. 
There are legitimate concerns that soldiers on the ground have been scapegoated for following orders 
and/or having received inadequate training, particularly on interrogation techniques.  
  50 
 
In summary, our research raises serious concerns about the adequacy of domestic investigations into 
alleged violations by UK soldiers during the Iraq war and occupation. As such, the positions and 
measures taken by UK authorities have often proven inadequate – and sometimes even detrimental – 
to ensuring accountability for those allegedly responsible for serious violations, involving in 
particular detainee abuse and unlawful deaths. The main bodies responsible for criminal 
investigations – IHAT and later SPLI – have faced serious obstacles conducting effective 
investigations, partly due to structural constraints and political opposition – and in some cases 
reported interference. It is regrettable that soldiers and victims alike have been negatively impacted 
by the continuing uncertainty caused by the lack of finality of investigations. The Government’s 
position should have been neutral and detached in order to preserve and foster the independence and 
efficiency of the investigation process. In reality, it has proven to be politically loaded and gives the 
impression that it is aimed at avoiding, rather than promoting, legal scrutiny, including the opening 
of a full ICC investigation. In light of the developments discussed in this paper, it is questionable 
whether UK authorities have the willingness to remedy the challenges needed for ensuring a genuine 
justice process.  
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ANNEX 1: TIMELINE OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ALLEGED 
CRIMES IN IRAQ 
 
4 October 2001  UK deposits instrument of ratification to the ICC Statute.  
 
1 July 2002 ICC jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide committed on UK Territory or by UK nationals begins 
 
20 March 2003 Armed conflict in Iraq begins with two rounds of airstrikes and 
deployment of ground troops 
 
7 April 2003 UK forces take control of Basra 
 
1 May 2003 US declares an end to major combat operations 
 
8 May 2003 US and UK Governments notify the President of the Security Council 
about their obligations as occupying powers 
 
30 June 2004 Occupation officially ends when an Interim Government of Iraq 
assumes full authority, informs Security Council of consent to presence 
of multinational forces 
 
September 2005 Seven British soldiers suspected of murdering an Iraqi civilian, 
Nadhem Abdullah on 11 May 2003, face court martial in Germany. 
This is the first time that UK soldiers in Iraq have been charged for the 
alleged murder of an Iraqi civilian. They are cleared of all charges due 
to insufficient evidence and because, the judge explained, ‘most of the 
Iraqi witnesses have exaggerated their evidence’ 
 
2006 ICC Prosecutor declines to open an investigation of British abuses in 
Iraq because the number of war crimes alleged is too small to justify 
ICC action 
 
30 December 2008 Multinational forces withdraw from Iraq at expiration of mandate 
provided for by UN Security Council Resolution 1790 
 
1 January 2009 Service Prosecuting Authority is formed 
 
19/20 January 2009 The High Court hears the case brought by Khadim Hassan against the 
Secretary of State for Defence seeking judicial review of the detention 
and treatment of his brother, Tarek Hassan, who was allegedly detained 
by British soldiers, hooded, beaten, and whose body was eventually 
found dumped in the desert wearing plastic handcuffs commonly used 
by US forces and with 8 bullet holes in his body  
 
25 January 2009 The High Court hands down a decision, based on the House of Lords 
decision in Al-Skeini, ruling that the ECHR did not extend to protect 
Tarek Hassan 
 
31 March 2009 British forces begin formal withdrawal from Southern Iraq 
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15 June 2009 British Prime Minister announces inquiry into British involvement in 
Iraq 
 
March 2010 IHAT is set up 
 
2 March 2010 ECtHR releases the decision for Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the UK, 
holding that the applicants were subject to inhuman and degrading 
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention  
 
7 July 2011 ECtHR releases the Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda decisions 
 
31 October 2012 The Supreme Court affirms a decision issuing a writ of appeal for Mr. 
Ramatullah (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs 
v Rahmatullah) 
 
24 May 2013 High Court rejects contention that IHAT is not independent in R (Ali 
Zaki Mousa and Others) (2) v Secretary of State for Defence, but 
suggests it needs a new approach for dealing with its large case load  
 
10 January 2014 ECCHR and PIL submit an Article 15 communication to the ICC 
Prosecutor alleging UK responsibility for war crimes in Iraq from 2003 
to 2008 
 
13 May 2014 ICC Prosecutor announces that the preliminary examination of the 
situation in Iraq, previously concluded in 2006, is re-opened 
 
16 September 2014 ECtHR finds no violation of Article 5 in Tarek Hassan’s case; holds 
that his capture and detention were consistent with the powers available 
to the UK under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and was not 
arbitrary 
 
7 April 2015 UK Government submits a comprehensive response to the allegations 
in the January 10 communication to the ICC Prosecutor 
 
29 September 2015 PIL submitted a second Article 15 communication expanding the list 
of alleged crimes 
 
January 2016 Head of IHAT, Mark Warwick says there is significant evidence to put 
a strong case before the SPA to prosecute British soldiers who have 
served in Iraq 
 
12 May 2016 Ministry of Defence v Iraqi Civilians decided. Claims by 600+ Iraqis 
against the UK Government are dismissed on procedural grounds 
 
June 2017  IHAT is officially terminated and replaced with the SPLI 
 
November 2017 Office of the ICC Prosecutor announced in its annual report on 
preliminary examinations that the UK/Iraq examination has proceeded 
to phase 3, where the Prosecutor focuses on issues of admissibility  
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ANNEX 2: A SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORKS 
 
1. UK DOMESTIC LAW  
 
a) UK military law 
 
It is beyond the scope of this discussion paper to address comprehensively the complex legal 
regulation of British armed forces. However, it is useful to provide here a brief overview of key legal 
instruments and the role played by various bodies in enforcing the rules.  
 
In the UK, the Armed Forces Act, as introduced in 2006 and most recently amended in 2016,295 is the 
key legal instrument of military law. It is however supplemented by other statutory instruments, 
including the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (UK), the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1968 (UK) and 
instruments issued by the Secretary of State under statutory authority, such as the Army Custody Rules 
2000 (UK) (S.I. 2000, No. 2368). Additionally, subordinate legislation in the form of regulations and 
orders, such as the Custody and Summary Dealing (Army) Regulations 2000 (UK) issued by the 
Defence Council, apply to the armed forces.296  
 
As a key principle of UK military law, all service personnel are subject to ordinary UK criminal law, 
meaning that when they serve in the UK they have the same status as any other UK citizen in terms 
of how they are treated if they commit an offence under civilian law.297 The Armed Forces Act 
provides that ‘it is an offence for a person subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service 
discipline, to do something which is an offence under the criminal law of England and Wales or 
would be such an offence if done in England or Wales.’298 The MoD observes that the ‘Service Justice 
System reflects UK civilian law as closely as possible but it goes further still: high standards of 
behaviour are required by the Armed Forces at all times and wherever they serve. These are standards 
that are distinctive to the armed forces and that demand certain conduct that would not be tolerated 
in civilian employment such as absence without leave or disobeying a lawful command.’299 In some 
situations, civilians may be subject to military law.300 
 
The main purpose of introducing the Armed Forces Act 2006 was to replace the three separate systems 
of service law with a single, harmonised system governing all members of the armed forces, while 
maintaining key elements of the discipline, in particular a jurisdiction for Commanding Officers 
(COs) to deal with less serious offences, whereas more serious offences must be tried by court martial. 
Most provisions of the Act are based on existing provisions, but updated and modified to ‘achieve 
harmonisation between the Services.’301 The 2006 Act has removed the power of COs to deal with 
serious cases.  
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According to the MoD, some of the key principles of the Armed Forces Act are that service law 
should ‘be fair and be seen to be fair’; ‘be conducive to the expeditious application of justice’; ‘be 
efficient and simple to use – it should not overburden Commanding Officers’; ‘reinforce the link 
between command and discipline’; ‘be “transportable” anywhere in the world’; ‘be compliant with 
the ECHR’; and ‘provide for consistency in treatment within single and joint Service 
environments.’302  
 
In summary, the Act creates specific offences and provides for the investigation of such offences, the 
arrest, holding in custody and charging of individuals accused of committing an offence, and for them 
to be dealt with summarily by their CO or tried by court-martial.303  
 
Concerning trials of military personnel, the previous system was based on ad hoc courts martial being 
set up to deal with particular cases, whereas the Armed Forces Act provides for a standing court 
martial, referred to as the ‘court martial’. The court martial may sit in more than one place at the same 
time, and different judge advocates and service personnel will make up the court for different trials.304 
The court martial, seen as ‘a compliant court within the meaning of the ECHR’, comprises a civilian 
judge advocate and a panel of 3, 5 or 7 Service members depending on the seriousness of the offence 
charged. Service members will be predominantly of the Service of the accused.305 
 
The Armed Forces Act also provides that more serious cases must be notified to the service police 
and passed directly to the DSP, who is independent of the military chain of command, for a decision 
on whether to prosecute. In other cases the CO will consider whether to deal with the matter 
summarily, or to refer the case to the DSP with a view to proceeding to a trial by the court martial. 
The DSP is the sole authority mandated to take the decision whether to prosecute in cases before 
court martial.306  
 
Military personnel facing charges which the CO intends to deal summarily have a right to elect trial 
by the court martial, or, if they agree to be dealt with summarily and the charge is found proved, to 
appeal to the Summary Appeal Court. A person convicted by the court martial will be able to appeal 
to the court martial Appeal Court. Besides the Summary Appeal Court (SAC), the Armed Forces Act 
establishes the Service Civilian Court (SCC), to replace the existing Standing Civilian Courts. The 
Act also provides the merger of the two offices of Judge Advocate General and Judge Advocate of 
the Fleet, and establishes a single court administration officer for the court martial, the SAC and the 
SCC.307 
 
The Act establishes that the punishment available on conviction depends on those available for the 
corresponding civilian offence. A sentence of imprisonment, or a fine, must not exceed the maximum 
sentence that could be imposed for the corresponding civilian offence, although service personnel 
may face other sanctions such as dismissal with disgrace.308 
 
The Armed Forces Act imposes duties on COs to investigate ‘allegations of service offences, of 
circumstances which indicate that a service offence may have been committed and of other 
circumstances that may be prescribed’, and provides that ‘if a CO becomes aware of certain 
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allegations or circumstances, he must ensure that the service police are aware of them.’309 The Act 
further provides that where a service policeman considers that there is sufficient evidence to charge 
a person with a Schedule 2 offence (defined as “serious disciplinary offences, such as mutiny and 
desertion, and serious criminal offences, such as murder, manslaughter and certain sexual offences”), 
he must refer the case to the DSP. Where the service policeman considers that there is sufficient 
evidence to charge the person with a service offence, but the circumstances do not require a reference 
to the DSP, he must refer the case to the person’s CO.310 
 
The SPA, regulated by the Armed Forces Act, was formed on 1 January 2009 (with the incorporation 
of the Navy Prosecution Authority, Army Prosecuting Authority and Royal Air Force Prosecuting 
Authority). The role of the SPA is to review cases referred to it by the Service Police or Chain of 
Command and to prosecute appropriate cases at court martial or Service Civilian Court. The SPA 
will also act as respondent in the Summary Appeal Court and represent the Crown at the court martial 
Appeal Court. The DSP and the SPA act under the general superintendence of the Attorney General 
and remain fully independent of the Military Chain of Command. However, as a government funded 
organisation it receives its funding as part of the defence budget. 311 
 
The SPA is composed of service lawyers who are independent of the chain of command and who are 
organisationally separate from the brigade or divisional military lawyers who advise commanders at 
that level on prosecutions or on operational matters relating to the law of armed conflict. If the SPA 
decides that no court martial should take place, for example because it is seen to not be in the ‘service 
interest’ or because the SPA considers that there is a reasonable chance of a conviction, the alleged 
offender cannot face other sanctions.312  
 
The SPA’s mission statement reads as follows:  
 
The Service Prosecuting Authority provides for the independent, efficient and consistent consideration of 
criminal cases and offences contrary to military discipline. It will initiate prosecutions where justified and 
conduct fair and thorough proceedings in the service courts of first instance and the service appellate courts, 
whilst liaising effectively with the police and dealing with prosecution witnesses and victims of crime with care 
and sensitivity. Whilst maintaining independence from the service chain of command, the Service Prosecuting 
Authority fulfils its functions in support of operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces throughout the 
world.313 
 
At the time of discussing amendments of the Armed Forces Act in 2016 in the House of Lords, some 
criticism was raised relating to the court martial system arising out of the handling of Iraq claims. 
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) proposed ‘that serious offences of murder, manslaughter and rape, 
and serious sexual offences, should be tried in our ordinary Crown Courts and no longer by court 
martial – the system that is under attack’.314 Further, Baroness Jolly questioned the independence of 
Service Police: ‘Service police forces are institutionally unable to offer the necessary independence 
in cases involving allegations of serious sexual assault and rape, especially in cases where both the 
victim and alleged perpetrator are service personnel, as there is a risk they may know those involved. 
Service police may have been trained, but they do not have the expertise and experience to investigate 
the most serious offences. In its report, HMIC has raised a number of concerns on this matter. Should 
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not allegations of sexual assault and rape involving members of the Armed Forces always be 
investigated by civilian, rather than service, police forces?’315 
 
b) 2005 Inquiry Act  
 
The 2005 Inquiry Act is intended to provide a comprehensive statutory framework for inquiries set 
up by Ministers to look into matters of public concern. It gives effect to proposals contained in a 
Government consultation paper, dated 6 May 2004 entitled ‘Effective Inquiries’, which itself arose 
out of a memorandum, submitted to the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee 
as part of its ‘Government by Inquiry’ investigation.316 The power to establish an inquiry rests with 
any Minister.317 
 
With respect to criminal liability, section 2 of the Inquiry Act 2005 provides that: ‘an inquiry panel 
is not to rule on, and has no power to determine, any person’s civil or criminal liability.’ The 
explanatory notes clarify that an inquiry ‘must not purport to do so’, noting that ‘there is often a strong 
feeling, particularly following high profile, controversial events, that an inquiry should determine 
who is to blame for what has occurred’ but ‘inquiries are not courts and their findings cannot and do 
not have legal effect.’318 The aim of inquiries is ‘to help to restore public confidence in systems or 
services by investigating the facts and making recommendations to prevent recurrence, not to 
establish liability or to punish anyone.’319 A public inquiry is unable to recommend individuals for 
prosecution but has the power to grant certain forms of immunity from prosecution.  
 
The remit of the inquiry must be set out by the Minister in the terms of reference before the setting-
up date. The inquiry chairman is required to do what he considers reasonable to ensure public access 
to evidence.320 Further, the general exemptions for the records of statutory inquiries in the Freedom 
of Information Act 2000 do not apply since an inquiry is not a public authority for the purposes of 
that Act.321 Once an inquiry is completed, its records are generally held by a public authority.322 
Sections 19 and 20 of the Act clarify that there may be circumstances in which part or all of an inquiry 
must be held in private. 
  
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW INCORPORATED INTO UK LAW 
 
Relevant legislation relating to the UK armed forces includes the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, 
which criminalises grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions by any person of any nationality acting 
within or outside the UK; the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the ECHR into UK law; 
the International Criminal Court Act 2001, which incorporates the ICC Statute into UK law; and 
section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which criminalises acts of torture committed by a public 
official or person acting in an official capacity, whatever his or her nationality, and has domestic and 
extra-territorial application. 
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a) International humanitarian law 
 
The Geneva Conventions Act 1957,323 last amended by the Geneva Conventions and United Nations 
Personnel (Protocols) Act 2009,324 implements specific provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
such as those concerning grave breaches and obligations concerning certain legal proceedings 
including those relating to protected prisoners of war. Even if the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 
includes in its four schedules each of the four Geneva Conventions, the Conventions in their entirety 
are not generally incorporated into UK law.325 
  
The 1957 Geneva Conventions Act was amended by the Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act 1995 
which adds each of the 1977 Additional Protocols as schedules. The amendment incorporates into 
UK law the grave breach provisions of Additional Protocol I, Articles 11(4) and 85 (2, 3, and 4). The 
amendment was passed before British ratification of the two Additional Protocols, and section 7 of 
the Act requires that the Protocols ‘shall for the purposes of this Act be construed subject to and in 
accordance with any reservation or declaration [made].’ Upon the UK’s ratification, the Government 
made declarations relating to Additional Protocol I (28 January 1998) and these are set out in the 
Geneva Conventions Act (First Protocol) Order 1998, Statutory Instrument No. 1754.326 
 
Besides incorporated treaty law, rules of customary international law, including those relating to 
humanitarian law, form part of UK domestic law under certain circumstances. Whereas the UK as a 
so-called dualist State operates with the principle that international treaties have effect in domestic 
law only if they are incorporated by an Act of Parliament, it is generally accepted, as eminent scholar 
Sir Ian Brownlie has stated that ‘customary rules are to be considered part of the law of the land and 
enforced as such with the qualification that they are incorporated only so far as is not inconsistent 
with Acts of Parliament or prior judicial decision of final authority.’327 Accordingly, UK courts can 
apply customary international law, including rules of humanitarian law, even in the absence of 
previous parliamentary sanction.328 As Lord Mance has observed, customary international law, ‘once 
established, can and should shape the common law, whenever it can do so consistently with domestic 
constitutional principles, statutory law and common law rules which the courts can themselves 
sensibly adapt without it being, for example, necessary to invite Parliamentary intervention or 
consideration.’329 
 
The UK’s ministerial code previously referred to an ‘overarching duty on Ministers to comply with 
the law including international law and treaty obligations’, but this was changed in October 2015 to 
refer more simply to ‘the overarching duty on Ministers to comply with the law’ without any reference 
to international law or treaty obligations. However, commentators have noted that the reference to 
comply with the law includes international law binding in the UK legal system and the previous 
formulation did not require Ministers to put international law above any other rule of 
law.330 Accordingly, both incorporated treaty rules and customary international law governing 
humanitarian law form part of the common law and UK law requires ministers to act consistently 
with its requirements, subject to the caveats mentioned above. 
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In Hassan v United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR reviewed the deprivation of liberty 
of a young Iraqi male by British armed forces during the phase of active hostilities in Iraq, which 
besides issues relating to extraterritorial application of the law raised issues concerning the 
relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law. In its judgment of 16 
September 2014, the ECtHR ruled that by reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided by 
international humanitarian law and the ECHR in time of armed conflict, the grounds of permitted 
deprivation of liberty found in both bodies of law should, as far as possible, be accommodated and 
applied concomitantly.331 Accordingly, as De Koker notes, the judgment is noteworthy in that it states 
explicitly for the first time the Court’s view that the interaction between humanitarian and human 
rights law is not governed by the lex specialis principle, but rather these bodies of law supplement 
each other in the context of armed conflicts, including in Iraq.332 
 
b) International human rights law 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the ECHR into UK law.333 The ECHR is the only human 
rights treaty that has been domesticated fully into UK law. 
 
Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 establishes that ‘so far as it is possible to do so, primary 
legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect to in a way which is compatible 
with Convention rights.’ Section 6(1) provides that it is ‘unlawful for a public authority to act in a 
way that is incompatible with Convention rights’; Section 7(1) gives persons the right to bring 
proceedings in UK courts against a public authority alleged to have breached Convention rights; and 
Section 8(1) establishes that UK courts may grant such relief or remedy as they find ‘just and 
appropriate’. 
 
As mentioned elsewhere in this discussion paper, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has had a significant 
impact on UK military law, the understanding of the UK’s obligations abroad and the legal resolution 
of the Iraq claims. Here, it suffices to mention the following: 
 
With respect to the court martial system, the ECtHR ruling in Findlay v United Kingdom meant that 
the absence of full judicial powers on the part of the judge advocate were incompatible with Article 
6 of the ECHR concerning the right to fair trial.334 As Rubin notes, the 1996 Act corrected that 
position and further abolished ‘the anomalous situation that the convenor of a court martial was the 
complainant CO’s own superior (his brigade or divisional commander).’335 
 
In Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, the ECtHR rejected the UK Government’s argument that the 
Convention had no extraterritorial application and held that as an occupying power the UK had 
exercised effective authority and control over individuals killed in the course of security operations 
in Iraq and thus was bound by the Convention. The Court also ruled that the UK Government had a 
duty under Article 2 of the Convention to investigate allegations of deaths and ill-treatment involving 
British service personnel in Iraq. The ECtHR found that all six deaths fell within the jurisdiction of 
the UK under Article 1 of the Convention because of the exceptional circumstances deriving from 
the UK’s assumption of authority and responsibility for security in South East Iraq, as an occupying 
power from 1 May 2003 to 28 June 2004. Accordingly, the Court held that the obligation in Article 
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2 of the Convention to investigate deaths applied, including an obligation to take all reasonable steps 
to ensure an effective and independent investigation. The ECtHR held that there had been a breach 
of the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to carry out an adequate and effective 
investigation into the deaths of the relatives of the first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants, but 
did not find a violation in respect of the sixth applicant as a full, public inquiry relating to his death 
was nearing completion at the time of its judgment.336 
 
In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR held that the Iraqi applicants had been 
subject to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3. The case concerned whether the transfer 
by the UK of the applicants who were in the custody of UK troops in Iraq to Iraqi authorities for trial 
would violate the applicants’ ECHR rights, specifically the non-refoulement principle previously 
established by the Court, because there was serious risk of them being subjected to the death 
penalty.337  
Similar cases have arisen in relation to allegations against other armed forces, which were part of the 
occupation of Iraq. For instance, Jaloud v The Netherlands concerned the investigation by The 
Netherlands authorities into the circumstances surrounding the death of an Iraqi civilian who died of 
gunshot wounds in April 2004 in an incident involving Netherlands Royal Army personnel. The 
ECtHR held there had been a violation of Article 2 in failing to carry out an effective investigation: 
records of key witness statements had not been submitted to the judicial authorities; no precautions 
against collusion had been taken before questioning the Netherlands Army officer who had fired at 
the car carrying the victim; and the autopsy of the victim’s body had been inadequate. The complaint 
about the investigation into the incident – which had occurred in an area under the command of an 
officer of the armed forces of the United Kingdom – fell within the jurisdiction of The Netherlands, 
and the Court noted in particular that The Netherlands had retained full command over its military 
personnel in Iraq.338 
c) International criminal law  
 
Because this discussion paper addresses relevant international criminal law concepts and provisions 
elsewhere, this section only provides for a cursory overview of the domesticating Act in the UK.  
 
The UK ratified the ICC Statute on 4 October 2001, thereby providing the ICC with jurisdiction over 
the statutory crimes of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed on British 
territory or by British nationals abroad as of 1 July 2002, and taking upon itself other duties set out 
in the ICC Statute, including with respect to cooperating with the Court.  
 
Before ratification, the UK adopted the International Criminal Court Act 2001.339 The Act addresses 
issues relating to how British authorities must process ICC requests for arrest and transfer (Part 2); 
other forms of assistance (Part 3); enforcement of sentences and orders (Part 4); definitions of ICC 
Statute offences and other key definitions, including of command responsibility (Part 5); and general 
provisions relating to interpretation of the Act (Part 6). The International Criminal Court Act 2001 
creates more than 60 substantive offences in UK criminal law and explicitly criminalises ancillary 
offences of aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring, inciting, assisting another, attempting, conspiring 
to commit, or concealing the commission of any of the substantive offences.340 Under the 
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International Criminal Courts Act 2001 British service personnel can be tried for war crimes before 
courts martial. 
 
Section 65 of the Act establishes criminal liability of commanders and other superiors ‘for offences 
committed by forces under his effective command and control’ or ‘authority and control’ on the basis 
of negligence (i.e. that the commander knew or ought to have known about the offences and ‘failed 
to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power’ to prevent such conduct or to have 
the conduct investigated and prosecuted. There are however some notable differences between the 
treatment of command responsibility in the ICC Statute and the International Criminal Court Act 
2001. Command responsibility is regarded as a sui generis form of liability in the ICC Statute, but as 
Gready observes, the domesticating Act in the UK considers it a form of secondary participation 
where commanders are instead held liable for aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the 
commission of the offence.341 Commentators have noted ‘[q]uite how conduct which could amount 
to “turning a blind eye” to the commission of a crime can amount to aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring the offence is moot but seems inconsistent with existing English law.’342  
 
Concerning complementarity, some commentators have noted that ‘the Act seems to have been 
designed to achieve a conservative compromise, maintaining as much domestic law and procedure as 
possible, whilst incorporating the minimum of the ICC Statute necessary to achieve 
complementarity’.343  
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